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ABSTRACT 
Understanding Thought Disorder in Schizophrenia-Spectrum Disorders: 
Exploring the Relation and Implications of Affect 
 
Rachel Nicole Waford 
 
June 6, 2013 
 
The significance of affect in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders has received 
considerable support, including its role in cognitive processing and executive function.  
Findings examining affect and cognition in schizophrenia appear to parallel findings with 
healthy controls: positive affect contributes to broad, top-down processing and negative 
affect leads to narrow, bottom-up processing.  This dissertation extends this exploration 
to the study of affect and its role in thought disorder, a core, and yet enigmatic feature of 
schizophrenia-spectrum disorders.  
This dissertation examines the role of affective intensity and valence in thought 
disorder severity.  Self-reported affective intensity and valence were assessed with the 
PANAS, and thought disorder severity was evaluated by scoring Rorschach protocols 
using the Thought Disorder Inventory.  The dissertation has two hypotheses: (1) affective 
intensity is a more significant factor than affective valence in predicting the severity of 
thought disorder in schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder, and (2) positive affect is 
related to categories that reflect broader, more associative processing, while negative 
affect is related to categories that reflect narrowed processing. 
Both hypotheses were supported.  Affective intensity significantly predicted 
thought disorder severity and was a better predictor, overall, then affective valence.  
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Furthermore, positive and negative affect were related to indicators of broad versus 
narrow processing, respectively.  Self-reported negative affect emerged as a particularly 
salient variable in thought disorder severity and presentation.  The current findings have 
implications for our understanding of the mechanisms underlying thought disorder 
severity in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, and the significance of affective experience 
in this spectrum of illness.
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INTRODUCTION AND AIMS 
 
 “Naturally, I’m growing my father’s hair.”  Such a remark likely evokes a variety 
of responses.  Some may feel confused but assume they just missed a critical piece of the 
story.  Another may presume that the individual speaking is more intelligent or even 
poetic and, therefore, may be speaking with more sophisticated language.  Finally, one 
may induce that the person in question is exhibiting disordered thought that is indicative 
of a minor slip or evidence of a chronic problem.  No matter what the response, most 
would likely conclude that the above statement lacks both clarity and logic, and is 
somewhat odd.  While these descriptions are relevant to the entire range of human 
thought (McKenna & Oh, 2005), they are also specific to thought disorder, a significant 
area of research that has spanned the last century.  Historically, thought disorder was a 
core feature of dementia praecox and later a sine qua non of schizophrenia (Levy et al., 
2010).  For Paul Meehl, the above utterance was the “diagnostic bell-ringer” for 
schizophrenia (1977, cited from Levy et al., 2010, p. 177).   
In addition to disordered thought, schizophrenia is also characterized by positive 
symptoms indicative of an excess of what is seen in healthy individuals (e.g., auditory 
and visual hallucinations, delusional beliefs), negative symptoms indicative of an absence 
of experience normally seen in healthy individuals (e.g., anhedonia, avolition, flat 
affect), and notable cognitive decline or dysfunction.  Affecting approximately 1% of 
individuals in the United States, this chronic disorder has a negative impact on social and 
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occupational functioning (American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th ed., text revision [DSM-IV TR], 2000; National Institute 
of Mental Health [NIMH], 2009).  Given the variety of symptoms characteristic of 
schizophrenia, intragroup heterogeneity is also prevalent, with one individual with 
schizophrenia potentially symptomatically quite different from another.  Thus, 
consideration of the variability of the clinical presentation of schizophrenia becomes 
critical. The study of thought disorder, often viewed as a core feature of schizophrenia, is 
of particular importance as detailed below. 
Background and Significance 
Thought disorder (see Table 1 for definition of terms) has been considered a 
fundamental component of schizophrenia since Emil Kraepelin’s description of dementia 
praecox in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Andreasen, 1982; Kring, Kerr, Smith, & 
Neale, 1993; Levy et al., 2010).  Kraepelin defined severe mental illness as disorders of 
thought and mood, a conceptualization commonly referred to as the Kraepelinian 
dichotomy (Lake, 2008).  He concluded dementia praecox was distinguished by disorders 
of self-expression, internal speech, and train of thought (Andreasen, 1982).  Disordered 
thought was further characterized by derailments in thinking (Lake, 2008; Levy et al., 
2010), specifically loose associations and incoherence (Levy et al., 2010).  Eugen Bleuler 
renamed Kraepelin’s dementia praecox as schizophrenia in 1911 to represent what 
Bleuler conceptualized as a splitting of psychic functions (Andreasen, 1979a).  Bleuler 
paid particular attention to disordered thought, typified by associative loosening that was 
both fundamental to schizophrenia (Andreasen, 1979a; McKenna & Oh, 2005) and 
“always present” (Andreasen, 1979a, p. 1315).  While both Kraepelin and Bleuler 
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emphasized thought disorder as critical to the understanding of schizophrenia, Kraepelin 
conceptualized thought disorder as “a train that was derailing” while Bleuler described it 
as “torn and poorly mended fabric” (Andreasen, 1982, p. 293).   
Bleuler’s conceptualization of schizophrenia also emphasized affective 
disturbance as another core feature of the illness, identifying prominent delusions and 
hallucinations as secondary symptoms (Kring et al., 1993).  However, affective 
symptoms did not gain importance in the understanding of schizophrenia until the 
introduction of schizoaffective disorder by Jacob Kasanin in 1933 (Lake, 2008).  It was 
during this time that the prominence or absence of affective symptoms differentiated a 
spectrum of schizophrenic disorders.  However, thought disorder maintained its status as 
a core feature of the illness and efforts continue to “capture the essence” (Levy et al., 
2010, p. 177) of schizophrenia.   
Current Perspectives 
Despite its lengthy history in the schizophrenia literature, the understanding of 
and treatment for thought disorder has been far surpassed by research in other areas of 
schizophrenia as evidenced by extensive reviews and treatment interventions devoted 
specifically to the more prominent positive and negative symptoms of the illness (see 
Wykes, Steel, Everitt, & Tarrier, 2008 and Kingdon & Turkington, 2008, respectively).  
Against this backdrop, Levy et al. (2010) recently summarized the field by reporting 
“general agreement that thought disorder is multidimensional, that it occurs in 
schizophrenic and nonschizophrenic conditions, and that its manifestations cover a 
spectrum of severity” (p. 177).  Unfortunately, this broad summary appears to highlight 
all that is not known by failing to differentiate thought disorder from the multitude of 
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other psychiatric symptoms that are subsumed under that description.  This recent 
summary of the field, alone, reflects a need for continued, rigorous study of thought 
disorder and perhaps speaks to the benefits of getting “back to the basics” of 
psychopathology to re-examine thought disorder in schizophrenia.    
The prevalence of thought disorder in a variety of different psychiatric 
presentations including but not limited to mania, depression, and healthy individuals, 
suggests that relevant findings within these groups may reveal something about thought 
disorder in schizophrenia.  The relationship between psychosis and thought disorder has 
been examined in this regard across individuals with schizophrenia and affective 
disorders.  Specifically, efforts to explore the association between thought disorder and 
hallucinations and delusions have resulted in inconsistent conclusions, a finding that will 
be discussed at length.  That thought disorder also occurs in disorders primarily 
characterized by disturbances in affect also suggests that affect may be involved in 
thought disorder, as it is relevant to a range of psychiatric illness (Cicchetti, Ackerman, & 
Izard, 1995; Kring & Bachorowski, 1999).  The aim of the current research is to explore 
the possible role of affect as a moderator of the severity and presentation of thought 
disorder in schizophrenia. 
Assessments and Models of Thought Disorder 
 As the zeitgeist in our formulation of psychopathology has evolved, so has our 
understanding of thought disorder.  The works of Kraepelin and Bleuler emphasized a 
disordered thought process that while bizarre, vague, and more effortful, was often not 
flawed (McKenna & Oh, 2005).  These early conceptualizations of thought disorder were 
global, evaluating the intended thought as a whole.  More recently, a debate has surfaced 
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over the vague boundaries between disorders of thought, language, and speech, and has 
led to inconclusive resolutions.  Proponents for the use of the term speech disorder rather 
than thought disorder focus on semantic activation and use of context (Levy et al., 2010), 
syntax and phonology (Lanin-Kettering & Harrow, 1985), and referential words or 
phrases (Docherty & Hebert, 1997).  While there is no disagreement about a link between 
thought, language, and speech, disagreement has focused on the use of disordered speech 
as a proxy for disordered thought and the appropriateness of terms such as 
“communication deviance” or “communication failures”  (Levy et al., 2010, p. 179) to 
describe the complex link between thought, language and speech.  
This approach to understanding thought disorder is not novel; Kraepelin and 
Bleuler also emphasized the importance of disorders of speech and language as vehicles 
for conveying thought disorder, but identified disordered thought as the primary deficit 
(Levy et al., 2010).  Moreover, Vygotsky addressed this controversy in his classic work 
on the distinction between thought and language: “Thought is not merely expressed in 
words; it comes into existence through them.  Every thought tends to connect something 
with something else, to establish a relationship between things” (cited from Lanin-
Kettering & Harrow, 1985).  Holzman, Shenton, and Solovay (1986) provided one 
resolution to this debate by stating that language and speech are “transparent” (p. 361) 
mediums of thought that can become the focus of evaluation, if one so chooses.  The 
current paper will be operating from the same perspective; the term “thought disorder” 
will reflect examination of responses as a whole. 
Measures of Thought Disorder 
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The model of thought disorder to which one subscribes is directly related to the 
measurement of thought disorder employed for research or clinical purposes.  Because 
the evaluation of thought disorder is subjective, whether one chooses to evaluate within a 
sentence, from sentence to sentence, or the response in its entirety will directly impact the 
nature of the measure used as well as any conclusions about the type, rate, and severity of 
thought disorder (McKenna & Oh, 2005).  Consistent with the perspective discussed 
earlier, the current review only includes studies that utilized thought disorder measures of 
full statements and responses.  Measures that evaluate thought disorder in this fashion are 
of two types.  For the purpose of the current research these two types of measures will be 
classified as severity and subtype.  Examples of each type, including scoring procedures 
and psychometric properties, are available in Table 2.   
 Despite the homogeneity one may expect from a more gestalt view of thought 
disorder, there remains an underlying inconsistency regarding clear definitions of severity 
and subtype.  Despite Andreasen’s early efforts to develop reliable and valid definitions 
of thought disorder (1979a), the operationalization of thought disorder remains fuzzy and 
malleable (Andreasen 1979a; 1979b; 1982; Levy et al, 2010).  This can be clearly seen in 
the variability across the five major thought disorder assessments described in Table 2.  
For example, a response that is extremely brief, concrete, and generally limited would 
likely be identified as severe poverty of speech using the Scale for the Assessment of 
Thought, Language and Communication (TLC; Andreasen, 1979a, 1979b), as defined in 
Tables 1 and 2.  However, this same response would receive a score of “0,” on the Index 
of Positive Thought Disorder (IPTD; Marengo, Harrow, Lanin-Kettering, & Wilson, 
1986), indicating the absence of thought disorder as described in Table 2.  In addition, 
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Nancy Docherty’s Communication Disturbance Index (CDI; Docherty, DeRosa, & 
Andreasen, 1996) classifies word and phrase use into six categories of communication 
failure; scores are based on the frequency of each failure and no severity scores, per se, 
are noted.  Rather than reflect theoretical differences, this and other measurement 
discrepancies emphasize the inconclusive nature of thought disorder research findings, 
and the need to revisit the study and measurement of this impairment.  Inconsistencies 
such as the one described above and the differences illustrated in Table 2 further suggest 
a need to examine additional factors that may be related to thought disorder in an effort to 
better establish a common ground.  
Models of Thought Disorder   
Similar to the heterogeneity reflected in the measures of thought disorder shown 
in Table 2, there is also variability in the general model of thought disorder in 
schizophrenia as indicated by factor analytic studies.  While thought disorder is at times 
considered a feature of positive symptoms as evidenced by its inclusion in descriptions 
such as those provided by NIMH (2009) or in measures of positive symptoms such as the 
Scale for the Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS; Andreasen, 1984), factor analytic 
studies of schizophrenia have shown factor structures that account for thought disorder as 
an independent but related factor (Grube, Bilder, & Goldman, 1998; Kim et al., 2012; 
Lancon, Auquier, Nayt, & Reine, 2000; Mojtabai, 1999; Toomey et al., 1997).  These 
findings suggest that thought disorder is an area worthy of individual study, including the 
factor structure, unique correlates and moderators.  However, as discussed below studies 
specifically examining the factor structure of thought disorder in general and in 
	  	   8 
schizophrenia yield inconsistent findings (see Table 3 for sample characteristics and 
goodness of fit statistics). 
In the validation of the TLC, Andreasen (1979b) examined a positive/negative 
thought disorder dichotomy that was similar to the excess versus absence hypothesis 
reflected in positive and negative symptoms in schizophrenia, respectively.  Negative 
thought disorder was operationalized as poverty of speech and poverty of content of 
speech, and positive thought disorder included pressured speech, distractibility, 
tangentiality, derailment, incoherence, and illogicality.  Positive thought disorder was 
significantly associated with acute schizophrenia and mania, and negative thought 
disorder was significantly associated with chronic schizophrenia and poorer prognosis.   
 Harvey et al., (1992) sought to further examine the factor structure of eight TLC 
elements (poverty of speech, poverty of content of speech, pressured speech, 
tangentiality, derailment, incoherence, circumstantiality, and loss of goal) using five 
confirmatory factor analytic models: (1) null model; (2) one-dimensional model of 
severity; (3) positive/negative thought disorder from Andreasen (1979b) with the 
inclusion of loss of goal on the positive factor;  (4) a two factor model examining verbal 
productivity (poverty of speech and pressured speech) and disconnection (poverty of 
content of speech, tangentiality, derailment, incoherence, circumstantiality, and loss of 
goal); and a (5) three-factor model with poverty of speech, pressured speech, 
circumstantiality, and loss of goal on factor 1, incoherence and derailment on factor 2, 
and poverty of content of speech and tangentiality on factor 3.  Goodness-of-fit indices 
revealed that the two-factor verbal productivity/disconnection model was the best-fitting 
	  	   9 
model, followed by the three-factor model.  Contrary to Andreasen’s earlier findings 
(1979b), the positive/negative thought disorder model failed to emerge as a solution.  
 Expanding on Harvey et al. (1992), Cuesta and Peralta (1999) examined eight 
hypothetical models ranging from one to six factors, all of which included all 18 -thought 
disorder elements from the TLC.  Confirmatory factor analyses revealed that the best 
fitting model was comprised of 6 dimensions: negative (poverty of speech, poverty of 
content of speech, and perseveration); idiosyncrasies (word approximations and stilted 
speech); semantics (clanging and neologisms); attention (distractible speech and 
blocking); reference (echolalia and self-reference); and disorganization (pressured 
speech, tangentiality, derailment, incoherence, illogicality, circumstantiality, and loss of 
goal).  
While the studies above support the continued interest in examining thought 
disorder in schizophrenia, they have facilitated little progress toward a deeper 
understanding of the mechanisms of thought disorder in this population.  The speech 
versus thought disorder controversy is not the only significant discrepancy; the study of 
thought disorder has been fraught with definitional differences (Andreasen 1979a; 1979b; 
1982; Levy et al., 2010) that are echoed in the heterogeneity of measures and models of 
thought disorders described above.  Unfortunately, factor analytic studies of thought 
disorder have focused solely on the TLC.  Moreover, the use of the TLC varied across 
these three studies; two studies used only a subset of thought disorder elements from the 
TLC without any explanation for this procedure (Andreasen, 1979b; Harvey et al., 1992).  
Unfortunately, thought disorder is, at best, vaguely defined.  Therefore the current 
research follows the conceptualization of Holzman et al. (2005), in which thought 
	  	   10 
disorder is described as an impairment or deviation of thought measured through speech 
and characterized, in part, by the following: “…a jarring disconnection between words 
spoken and their consensual meaning, sudden, unexpected changes in the topic under 
discussion, a rhythmic repetition of phrases, obscure references to tangential topics, and 
even neologisms…” (p. 55).   
Thought Disorder in Schizophrenia 
 As described at length above, the study of thought disorder has a rich history but 
is burdened by many interpretations about what thought disorder is, and what it isn’t.  To 
provide a context to examine affect as a moderator of the severity and presentation of 
thought disorder in schizophrenia, the next section will review studies relevant to the 
conceptualization of thought disorder.  Refer to Table 3 for sample and study 
characteristics.   
Course and Severity of Thought Disorder: The Chicago Follow-Up Study 
The Chicago Follow-up Study (CFS) is a longitudinal, multidisciplinary study 
focusing on the course of psychosis and adjustment in adults with schizophrenia 
(Marengo et al., 1986).  Of particular interest in this project are the prevalence, course, 
severity, and relation to adjustment of thought disorder in schizophrenia and other 
psychotic and nonpsychotic disorders (Marengo et al., 1986).  Psychosis and psychotic 
disorders were defined by current experiences of delusions and/or hallucinations 
(Marengo et al., 1986).  The CFS utilized the Index of Positive Thought Disorder (IPTD) 
to assess bizarre-idiosyncratic thinking and separation from reality on a continuum from 
absent to severe.  Participants in this large study were comprised of an inpatient sample 
diagnosed primarily using Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC; Spitzer, Endicott, & 
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Robbins, 1978) that specify exclusions for any affective episode.  Efforts were made to 
evaluate patients within the first few weeks of admission to obtain data from an acute, 
medication-free sample.  This subsection will review significant studies from the CFS 
project related to the goal of the current research.   
Harrow, Grossman, Silverstein, and Meltzer (1982) examined acute thought 
disorder in 35 individuals with schizophrenia at admission and a subsample seven weeks 
later; twenty-five members of the acute sample were medication-free.  Of the sample 
measured at index, 50% exhibited severe thought disorder and 29% exhibited moderate 
thought disorder, revealing that 79% of the schizophrenia sample showed definite 
evidence of thought disorder as defined by the IPTD (Marengo et al., 1986).  Thought 
disorder was examined seven-weeks later in 21 of 35 individuals from the acute phase; 
76% percent of this subsample were receiving antipsychotic medication and fewer than 
50% of this sample were psychotic at follow-up as defined by the CFS project (see above 
description).  Forty-eight percent of individuals continued to exhibit severe thought 
disorder, followed by 14% exhibiting moderate thought disorder, suggesting that thought 
disorder persisted despite antipsychotic medication.  Only a trend toward a reduction in 
thought disorder severity emerged during this phase of treatment.   
Similar findings emerged in an examination of thought disorder at admission and 
one year follow-up (Harrow, Grossman, Silverstein, Meltzer, & Kettering, 1986a).  In a 
sample of 30 individuals with schizophrenia, 49% showed severe thought disorder at the 
acute stage of assessment and 26.5% exhibited moderate thought disorder, with a total of 
75.5% of the sample exhibiting definite thought disorder.  At follow-up, 27% of 
individuals displayed severe thought disorder, followed by 26.5% exhibiting moderate 
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thought disorder.  While no information was provided about medication status in the 
acute stage of assessment, 77% of the sample was taking psychotropic medications at 
follow-up (91% on antipsychotic medication), again suggesting that thought disorder 
persisted at a moderate to severe level despite medication. Furthermore, there were no 
significant differences in thought disorder severity between unmedicated individuals and 
individuals taking antipsychotic medication at follow-up. 
Harrow, Marengo, and McDonald (1986b) examined the early course of 
schizophrenia, specifically addressing whether persistent thought disorder occurs as part 
of an enduring illness or as part of a new episode of illness.  Forty-eight individuals with 
schizophrenia were assessed at hospital admission and one and half years later.  Eighty-
three percent of individuals were on antipsychotic medications at index and 52% at 
follow-up.  During the acute stage, 56% of the sample exhibited severe thought disorder, 
followed by 25% who displayed moderate thought disorder (81% showed definite 
thought disorder, overall).  At follow-up 27%, of the sample exhibited severe thought 
disorder, followed by 17% displaying moderate thought disorder.  While there was a 
significant decrease in thought disorder severity from the acute stage (M = 3.54) to 
follow-up (M = 2.70), results revealed that thought disorder (at all levels of severity) most 
often occurred in the context of a chronic, enduring illness.  Moreover, thought disorder 
did not appear to occur in isolation, but as part of a larger cluster of chronic symptoms or 
a new acute disturbance.  Individuals hospitalized at follow-up showed more severe 
thought disorder than those not hospitalized, and individuals medicated at follow-up 
showed more severe thought disorder than unmedicated patients.  While all but one of the 
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individuals exhibiting severe thought disorder at follow-up exhibited psychosis as defined 
by the CFS, this relationship was not explicitly examined. 
In an effort to further examine the course and persistence of thought disorder, 
Harrow and Marengo (1986) examined thought disorder in a sample of 44 individuals 
with schizophrenia at two time points following hospitalization: 1.5 – 2 years after 
discharge (FU1); and two years after follow-up 1 (FU2).  The authors specifically 
examined four trajectories of thought disorder: absent (no thought disorder at FU1 or 
FU2); acute (thought disorder at FU1 but not FU2); episodic (thought disorder at FU2 but 
not FU1); and persistent (thought disorder at both).  Fifty-three percent of the sample was 
receiving antipsychotic medication at FU1 and 59% at FU2.  At FU1, 24% exhibited 
moderate thought disorder, followed by 21% exhibiting severe thought disorder.  
Following the evaluation at FU2 (3.5 - 4 years after discharge), 24% of the sample 
showed an absence of thought disorder over time, 13% exhibited only acute thought 
disorder, 24% exhibited an episodic course, and 39% showed a persistent course of 
thought disorder over a four-year period.   
Building on the early research from the CFS mentioned above, Marengo and 
Harrow (1997) evaluated the longitudinal course of thought disorder at admission, and 
again 2, 4.5, and 7.5 years after admission.  Of the forty-five individuals with 
schizophrenia evaluated, 71% exhibited thought disorder at index.  Twenty-four percent 
of the sample were on no medication at any of the three follow-ups, 31% were on 
medication during at least one or two follow-ups, and 45% were on medication at all 
follow-ups.  The mean severity ratings at 2, 4.5, and 7-year follow-up were 2.8, 3.0, and 
3.0, respectively; severity correlated significantly and positively across all time points.  
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At the second year follow-up, 51% of the sample showed no thought disorder, 27% 
showed definite signs of abnormal thinking, and 27% displayed severe thought disorder.  
At 4.5 years after admission, 42% exhibited no thought disorder, followed by 20% 
showing moderate, and 38% displaying severe thought disorder.  Finally, 36% showed no 
thought disorder at 7.5-year follow-up, 22% displayed moderate thought disorder and 
42% exhibited severe thought disorder.  Using the procedure from Harrow and Marengo 
(1986) to examine trajectories of thought disorder, 18% showed no thought disorder at 
any follow-up evaluation, 18% exhibited an episodic, infrequent course (thought disorder 
at one follow-up), 40% displayed an episodic, frequent course (thought disorder at two 
follow-ups), and 24% showed a persistent course (thought disorder at all three follow-
ups).  While thought disorder was associated with psychosis as defined by the CFS at 2-
year follow-up, further examination of the course of thought disorder in relation to 
psychosis was nonsignificant, suggesting that thought disorder occurred independent of 
psychosis.  
Marengo and Harrow (1985) directly examined the relationship between 
psychosis and thought disorder in a sample of eighty-five individuals with schizophrenia.  
Results showed no difference in thought disorder severity between the 63% on 
antipsychotic medication and those unmedicated, and psychosis was shown to be 
unassociated with thought disorder in this sample.  
Overall, results from the CFS consistently reveal a significant and persistent 
course of thought disorder in hospitalized patients with schizophrenia.  Furthermore, 
thought disorder endured despite antipsychotic medication.  However, findings regarding 
the relationship between psychosis and thought disorder, and differences between 
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medicated and unmedicated individuals were mixed.  Additional examination of these 
groups, including remission rates for psychosis are needed to better understand these 
relationships.  While thought disorder persisted despite medication, it must also be noted 
that more severe individuals were more likely to receive medication, thereby making this 
cause-effect relationship unclear and in need of more exploration. 
Subtypes and Associated Features of Thought Disorder 
While the findings from the CFS highlight the persistence of thought disorder in 
schizophrenia, methodologies that address subtypes focus on the presentation of thought 
disorder elements within schizophrenia.  Harvey, Earle-Boyer, and Wielgus (1984) 
sought to examine the consistency of thought disorder in a sample of 20 inpatients with 
schizophrenia receiving antipsychotic medication.  These individuals were diagnosed 
using the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 3rd ed., (DSM-III, 
American Psychiatric Association, 1980).  Thought disorder was measured three times 
over the course of ten days using the TLC.  The authors examined two negative signs of 
thought disorder (poverty of speech and poverty of content of speech) and five positive 
signs of thought disorder (pressured speech, derailment, tangentiality, illogicality, and 
incoherence), and found that ratings across these seven elements were significantly 
related and stable across all three time points.  Moreover, the authors examined 
Andreasen’s positive/negative thought disorder dichotomy (1979b) and concluded that 
schizophrenia was primarily characterized by poverty of speech, and negative thought 
disorder, overall.  
Andreasen and Grove (1986) examined the utility of the TLC for diagnosis and 
prognosis in a sample of 50 inpatients with RDC -diagnosed (Spitzer et al., 1978) 
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schizophrenia.  The authors stated that “nearly all were medicated” but all were “severely 
symptomatic” (Andreasen & Grove, 1986, p. 350).  The participants were assessed on all 
eighteen elements of the TLC during the first week of their admission, and six months 
later.  Results showed that the sample displayed “empty” and “disorganized” thought 
disorder at index (Andreasen & Grove, 1986, p. 351), as defined by a higher frequency of 
poverty of speech and poverty of content of speech, and derailment, incoherence, and 
illogicality, respectively.  At six-month follow-up, this sample continued to show 
persistent disorganization with significant improvement only in pressured speech and 
incoherence. 
Harvey, Docherty, Serper, and Rasmussen (1990) examined thought disorder 
eight months after hospital admission in 22 individuals with DSM-III- (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1980) diagnosed schizophrenia.  Approximately 80% were 
receiving antipsychotic medications at follow-up, accompanied by anticholinergic 
treatments in approximately 70% of the entire sample.  Negative thought disorder, as 
identified by poverty of speech and poverty of content of speech from the TLC, was 
shown to be a stable trait in this sample of individuals with schizophrenia.  Positive 
thought disorder, as identified by pressured speech, derailment, tangentiality, 
incoherence, and illogicality, was also shown to be stable in this sample and related to the 
presence of psychosis (presence of delusions and/or hallucinations) at 8-month follow-up. 
The results from this subset of studies are similar to those of the CFS, suggesting 
that thought disorder endures despite medication, and a weak relationship exists between 
psychosis and thought disorder.  While the findings suggest heterogeneity of thought 
disorder, negative thought disorder might be particularly salient in schizophrenia. 
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Review of Thought Disorder in Schizophrenia: Problems with Methodology 
Taken together, studies of thought disorder in schizophrenia illustrate that a 
significant number of hospitalized individuals with schizophrenia exhibit definite 
abnormalities in thought, with a higher percentage showing moderate and severe thought 
disorder in the majority of studies.  Results further suggest that thought disorder in 
schizophrenia is often frequent and persists as part of an unremitting illness.  Finally, 
findings suggest that thought disorder in schizophrenia may be primarily characterized by 
poverty of speech and poverty of content of speech (Andreasen, 1979b; Andreasen & 
Grove, 1986; Harvey & Brault, 1986; Harvey et al., 1984; Taylor et al., 1994).  Mixed 
results for the relationship between psychosis and thought disorder suggest a trend for 
different symptom courses.  However, additional investigation of the remission rates for 
psychosis compared to thought disorder is needed to further clarify this association.  That 
thought disorder only mildly remits even with antipsychotic medication also supports the 
need to further explore the relationship with psychotic symptoms, and revisit thought 
disorder generally in schizophrenia, including reconsidering effective interventions. 
However, several methodological problems limit the generalizability of findings 
and have likely contributed to the narrowed understanding of thought disorder today.  
First and foremost, the samples used in CFS research were likely overlapping across 
studies; this procedure limits the strength of the findings.  Furthermore, comparisons of 
medicated versus unmedicated individuals do not clearly reveal whether thought disorder 
fails to remit despite medication, or whether individuals who are more severely 
symptomatic are simply receiving more medication and not responding as expected.  This 
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is an important consideration for later work not only for the proposed relationship of 
affect and thought disorder, but also the implications for treatment of thought disorder. 
 The conclusions regarding a positive/negative dichotomy should also be 
interpreted with caution as a closer look reveals that this conceptualization represents an 
oversimplification of the prevalence of thought disorder elements in schizophrenia, and 
the heterogeneity of thought disorder in schizophrenia, more generally.  While signs of 
negative thought disorder were shown to occur at a high frequency in schizophrenia, 
elements commonly associated with positive thought disorder occurred at an equal 
(Andreasen & Grove, 1986) or greater (Andreasen & Grove, 1986; Harvey et al., 1990; 
Harvey et al., 1984) frequency in this population.  This further supports the need for a 
better understanding of thought disorder, as it appears that interpretations about the 
characteristic nature of negative thought disorder in schizophrenia do not fully account 
for the heterogeneity of this impairment in this population.    
 The guidance and momentum needed for continued study in this area is also 
lacking.  Speculations about mechanisms of thought disorder have often occurred in a 
vague manner; very rarely did any of the above studies make explicit inferences about 
specific mechanisms or moderators, or identify specific areas in need of further research.  
Some studies implicated an underlying impairment such as frontal lobe pathology 
(McGrath, 1991), central nervous system dysfunction (Holzman et al., 1986), or speech 
disorder (Harvey & Brault, 1986; Harvey et al., 1984), while others have broadly 
implicated a set of factors, such as “ multiple factors, some of which are common to 
various diagnostic groups, and some of which may be more specific to certain types of 
thought-disordered patients” (Marengo & Harrow, 1985, p. 40).  Moreover, conclusions 
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made vague allusions to “different underlying cognitive processes” (Harvey & Brault, 
1986, p. 171), “different cognitive processes” (Holzman et al., 1986, p. 370), “different 
mechanisms” (Taylor, Reed, & Berenbaum, 1994, p. 325), and a need for a continued 
search of “mechanisms that sustain more persistent forms of thought disorder in 
schizophrenia…” (Marengo & Harrow, 1997, p. 282).  Psychosis, social 
inappropriateness, blending of self-referential material during communication, and acute 
illness have also been implicated as factors related to thought disorder severity, course, 
and presentation in schizophrenia (Harrow et al., 1982; Harrow et al., 1986b).  Finally, 
affective mechanisms have been identified as possible explanatory factors of thought 
disorder in schizophrenia, with particular emphasis on the distress, anxiety, emotional 
intensity, and excessive affect associated with more acute phases of the illness 
(Andreasen, 1979b; Harrow et al., 1986a; 1986b).  These latter speculations represent 
viable areas of further study. 
While the assessment and methodological concerns discussed above are 
significant, they are likely representative of a more fundamental issue; the 
conceptualization of thought disorder excludes moderating factors, particularly affect.  
Returning to the basics of what we know about the continuum from “normal” to 
pathology, decades of research implicate affect as an integral component of how 
individuals understand and convey their experience with their environment (Cicchetti et 
al., 1995; Kring & Bachorowski, 1999).  Therefore, it appears that affect may be a 
moderator that helps explain the unique severity and presentation of thought disorder in 
schizophrenia reported in the literature.  Specifically, the current research proposes that 
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affective intensity and valence moderate the severity and presentation of thought disorder 
in schizophrenia. 
Affect and Thought Disorder in Schizophrenia 
While affect, mood, and emotion are used somewhat interchangeably to describe 
emotional experience and expression, the literature suggests distinct states.  Batson, 
Shaw, and Oleson (1992), describe affect as the most general and primitive state that 
informs the individual about preferences or circumstances that are most valued.  Mood is 
further described as a type of affective state that illustrates a tone and level of intensity, 
and reflects expectations about future events (i.e., positive mood if positive affect and 
outcomes are expected).  Finally, emotion, also a type of affective state and therefore 
subjected to varying valence and intensity, reflects identification of a specific goal and 
access to that goal in the present.  While examination of emotional states could therefore 
occur at any one of the above levels, the current review will focus on affect more broadly, 
with the understanding that mood and emotion are subsumed under affect as these terms 
are often used synonymously as representative of a general emotional state. 
Affect and Cognition 
Research examining the impact of affect on cognitive processes in healthy 
individuals suggests that positive affect increases activation of associated networks, 
allowing for increased efficiency and creativity in a variety of different cognitive 
processes (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; Bar, 2009; Clore & Palmer, 2009; Fredrickson, 
2001).  A reciprocal relationship is also present, with more broad activation contributing 
to positive affect (Bar, 2009).   
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Conversely, negative affect contributes to narrow, bottom-up processing (Bar, 
2009; Clore & Palmer, 2009) such as the ruminative processes seen in individuals 
experiencing depression (Bar, 2009).  Schizophrenia studies have found a similar impact 
of negative affect on cognitive processes.  In a sample of individuals with schizophrenia, 
Halari, Mehrotra, Sharma, & Kumari (2006) found that self-reported feelings of 
depression and dejection were related to poor performance on measures of attention 
(adjusted R2 = 0.14, p < .05), executive function (B = -0.50, adjusted R2 = 0.24, p < .05), 
and verbal memory (B = -0.47, adjusted R2 = 0.24, p < .05).  Tension and anxiety also 
predicted poor verbal memory (B = -0.73, adjusted R2 = 0.24, p < .05) 
 Nancy Docherty and her colleagues (Docherty, Evans, Sledge, Seibyl, & Krystal, 
1994a; Docherty & Herbert, 1997; Docherty, Sledge, & Wexler, 1994b) have consistently 
shown that discussion of self-reported stressful/unpleasant and pleasant situations elicit 
negative and positive affect, respectively, in individuals with schizophrenia.  
Furthermore, this work has shown that discussion of events that bring about negative 
affect contribute to increased communication disturbances as measured by deficits in 
communicating meaning and reference failures from the CDI.  Mean differences in 
reference disturbance were found for pleasant/low stress conditions and unpleasant/high 
stress conditions (MLow = 1.8 versus MHigh = 3.5, p < .001, Docherty et al., 1994a; MPositive 
= .092 versus MNegative = .098, p < .05, Docherty, Sledge, & Wexler, 1994b; MPositive = 
2.45 versus MNegative = 3.42, p < .01, Docherty & Herbert, 1997).  Similarly, Burbridge 
and Barch (2002) found that negative-valenced, open-ended questions elicited more 
unclear references as measured by the CDI (MNegative = 3.3 versus MNeutral = 1.9), and 
correlated with measures of selective attention (r = .40, p < .05).  
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Affective intensity has also been shown to moderate the relationship between 
affect and cognition (Larsen & Diener, 1987).  Low versus high affect intensity 
differentially affects attention, information processing and encoding strategies during 
positive and negative mood states (Basso, Schefft, & Hoffman, 1994; Larsen & Diener, 
1987).  For example, a sample of female college students who reported low affective 
intensity and experienced a positive mood induction performed better on a word 
recognition task than those in the negative mood induction group.  Conversely, 
participants who reported high affective intensity and experienced neutral or negative 
mood inductions recognized more words than those in the positive induction condition 
(Basso et al., 1994).  Thus, affective intensity may be a moderator between affective 
valence and cognition. 
Affective intensity also appears to be dispositional and associated with a tendency 
toward particular cognitive processes or perspectives (Larsen, Diener, & Cropanzano, 
1987; Schimmack & Diener, 1997) a finding that holds across affective valence (Larsen 
& Diener, 1987).  It has been found that individuals who report high affective intensity 
also report using increased personalization, selective abstraction, and overgeneralization 
processing strategies when viewing positive- and negative-valenced pictures compared to 
those with low affective intensity who engaged in these operations much less so (Larsen, 
et al., 1987).  Those who reported high affective intensity have also been shown to 
exhibit a processing style that is more global and elaborative, personalized, and empathic 
in response to valenced-pictures compared with low-intensity individuals who were less 
likely respond in that manner (Larsen, et al., 1987). 
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While healthy individuals may joke about word-finding difficulties, distractibility, 
and disorganization during periods of strong negative or positive affect, these anecdotes 
build on what has been found in the affect and cognition literature: positive affect and 
increased activation of associated networks may contribute to an abundance of 
information that may be difficult to filter and lead to disordered thought, and negative 
affect and narrow processing may lead to limited or perseverative responding.  It is 
expected that this relationship is present in psychiatric populations, albeit at a much 
greater rate and degree of severity.  Given what we know about the relationship between 
affect and cognition, viewing thought disorder as a cognitive process similar to others 
suggests that thought disorder may also be moderated by similar factors (e.g., affect) 
(Goldberg & Green, 2002).   
Affect and Thought Disorder 
 Research specifically examining affect and thought disorder is limited both in 
breadth and depth, with respect to studies outside of affective disorders (i.e. bipolar 
disorder) and schizoaffective disorder.  However, the research that is available is 
consistent.  Individuals experiencing mania and thought disorder showed more mood 
lability than those with mania and no thought disorder, and individuals with 
schizophrenia (Jampala, Taylor, & Abrams, 1989).  Bipolar patients exhibiting a normal, 
non-depressed mood showed a higher proportion of immature responses, more examples 
of thought disorder, and more severe thought disorder overall than healthy controls as 
measured by the Rorschach Inkblot Test and Exner scoring system (Osher & Bersudsky, 
2007), and individuals with mania who also exhibited emotional blunting presented 
significantly more thought disorder elements than both individuals with mania but no 
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evidence of emotional blunting and individuals with schizophrenia (Jampala, Abrams, & 
Taylor, 1985).   
Overall, these findings suggest that dysregulation of affect may be related to 
increased thought disorder across a variety of groups.  However, the following 
methodological weaknesses limit the generalizability and strength of results: (1) the 
samples in the above studies were quite variable, and small (see Table 3); (2) both 
Jampala et al. (1985) and Jampala et al. (1989) utilized a measure of thought disorder that 
was created by the authors and limited to discussion of the following elements: flight of 
ideas (Jampala et al., 1989, only); neologisms; driveling; non-sequiters; tangentiality; 
private use of words; and paraphasias; (3) the measure of mood lability discussed by 
Jampala et al. (1989) was not explained; and (4) while the results from Jampala et al. 
(1985) regarding emotional blunting were suggestive, emotional blunting was not 
measured in the individuals with schizophrenia.  Finally, none of these studies 
acknowledged that mania could include positive mood (euphoria), negative mood 
(irritability), or both.  This is a particularly relevant methodological problem given the 
robust findings regarding the role of positive and negative affect on cognitive processes, 
and highlights the importance of examining affect in greater detail, paying specific 
attention to the range of affective experience. 
 An indirect measure of affect in thought disorder in schizophrenia was illustrated 
by examining thought disorder in core schizophrenia (emotional blunting and avolition) 
and non-core schizophrenia (no loss of expression or history of prominent affective 
disturbance, avolition possible) (Taylor et al., 1994).  Results showed differences in 
thought disorder between individuals with mania, schizoaffective disorder characterized 
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by mania (SADm), and schizophrenia, with significantly more individuals with mania 
and SADm exhibiting hyperverbal examples of thought disorder (defined by the authors 
as rapid speech, pressured speech, circumstantiality, distractibility, flight of ideas, 
clanging, and verbigeration), and significantly more individuals with schizophrenia 
exhibiting hypoverbal examples of thought disorder (defined by the authors as slow 
speech and paucity of speech).  Within schizophrenia, hypoverbal features primarily 
characterized individuals with core schizophrenia, while primarily hyperverbal features 
characterized those with non-core schizophrenia.   
This study again implicates the possible role of affect in thought disorder given 
the differences in thought disorder in manic states and the manifestation of thought 
disorder related to past and present affective disturbance in schizophrenia.  While these 
findings appear to support the positive/negative thought disorder dichotomy introduced 
earlier, these findings suggest an alternative perspective: a continuum of affective 
disturbance that may be related to thought disorder presentation and may impact thought 
disorder in schizophrenia.  While severity of thought disorder was not assessed in this 
study, the moderating relationship of affect on the severity and presentation of thought 
disorder proposed in the current research suggests that severity of thought disorder would 
be moderated by affect in a similar fashion.  Despite the significance of these latter 
findings, the use of only clinician-rated measures of emotional expression and the vague 
“present” versus “absent” measure of thought disorder pose problems for generalizing 
these findings. 
The studies above suggest promising results for the role of affect in the 
conceptualization of thought disorder in schizophrenia.  Unfortunately, the study by 
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Taylor et al. (1994) is the only study found that examined affect and thought disorder in 
schizophrenia, albeit indirectly.  Therefore, we are left to extrapolate from the limited 
research examining thought disorder and affect.  However, that approach is extremely 
weak given that none of the aforementioned studies measured affect, per se, leaving only 
inferences about intensity and valence.  In addition, only two of the four studies 
addressed medication usage, quantified by months on antipsychotic medication (Jampala 
et al., 1985; Jampala et al., 1989).  This is a relevant oversight when considering the 
impact of medication on affective symptoms (positive and negative) and the implications 
for the proposed relationship in the current research.  
Affect in Schizophrenia 
Bleuler described affect as a core feature of schizophrenia with self-reported 
emotional experiences often incongruent with outward expression.  Conversely, Sándor 
Radó suggested that the limited emotional expression in schizophrenia reflected a lack of 
emotional experience altogether (cited from Kring et al., 1993).  While most would argue 
against the stringency of the latter point, our understanding of affective experience in 
schizophrenia remains somewhat limited (Cohen & Minor, 2010).  However, the research 
that is available highlights the importance of affective experience in schizophrenia and 
comes from both induction and non-induction paradigms.  
Induction studies. 
Emotional experience. It is now well documented that both positive and negative 
emotions can be induced with affective stimuli in individuals with schizophrenia.  These 
induction paradigms present individuals valenced stimuli (pictures, words, etc.) and then 
ask for ratings of their level of pleasantness/happiness/arousal, and/or 
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unpleasantness/negative affect/aversion following discontinuation of the stimulus.  
Studies using these induction paradigms with individuals with schizophrenia demonstrate 
no differences between medicated versus unmedicated, inpatient versus outpatient, or 
male versus mixed samples (Cohen & Minor, 2010).  The level and intensity of induction 
also remains consistent across modalities including gustatory (pleasant and aversive 
drinks), visual (positive, negative, and neutral pictures), verbal (reading words of 
differing valence), behavioral (facial gestures and social interactions) (Cohen & Minor, 
2010), and physiological indicators (Kring & Caponigro, 2010).  Individuals with 
schizophrenia endorse pleasant emotions similar to or greater than that of controls when 
exposed to these evocative stimuli (Cohen & Minor, 2010; Kring & Caponigro, 2010).  
While individuals with schizophrenia demonstrate an affective experience that is 
comparable to controls, some deficits do exist.  Individuals with schizophrenia exhibit 
less prosody during emotional topics when compared to controls (Alpert, Rosenberg, 
Pouget, & Shaw, 2000), and have shown less arousal and change in response to 
emotional topics both physiologically (Park, Gupta, & Kim, 2011) and neurologically 
(Ursu, Kring, & Gard, 2011).  Most importantly, individuals with schizophrenia 
demonstrate difficulty reporting affective experience after a delay (Gold, 2011; Kring & 
Caponigro, 2010; Ursu et al., 2011) and at times report affect that is incongruent with the 
stimulus (Tremeau et al., 2009; Ursu et al., 2011), suggestive of the disconnection 
between experience of emotion and its verbal expression.  
Emotional expression. Emotional expression is often assessed through some 
observable indicators.  For individuals with schizophrenia, a clinician or another 
collateral reporter often conducts this assessment.  The distinction between experience 
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and expression is significant because expression is often used as the primary evidence for 
experience and the limited expression seen in schizophrenia conflates affective and 
cognitive processes.  It is possible that research examining negative symptoms in recent 
years became the default for affect research in schizophrenia, as some symptoms such as 
emotional blunting, flat affect, and anhedonia may, on the surface, appear to reflect 
emotional states.  However, robust findings illustrate that individuals with schizophrenia 
show significant discrepancies between clinician-rated affective expression and self-
reported affective experience (Agheveli, Blanchard, & Horan, 2003; Berenbaum & 
Oltmanns, 1992; Healey, Pinkham, Richard, Kohler, 2010; Kring & Moran, 2008; St-
Hilaire, Cohen, & Docherty, 2008).  Specifically, flat affect has been shown to be 
unrelated to emotional experience in schizophrenia (Kring & Moran, 2008) and negative 
symptoms in schizophrenia are distinct and unrelated to depressive symptoms (Malla, 
1995; Ulas, Akdede, Ozbay, Alptekin, 2008).  These discrepancies appear to be unrelated 
to antipsychotic medication treatment (Kring & Bachorowski, 1999; Kring & Earnst, 
1999). 
Non-induction studies. Similar to induction studies, non-induction studies (self-
reported affect independent of induction paradigm) demonstrate that individuals with 
schizophrenia experience significant levels of affect.  Studies exploring affective 
experience across valence show similar levels of positive and negative affect in 
schizophrenia and healthy controls when asked to rate their current emotional experience 
(Agheveli et al., 2003), and comparable percentages of positive and negative word use in 
self-descriptions (St-Hilaire et al., 2008).  Other work has emphasized increased baseline 
levels of negative affect in schizophrenia including depression (Berenbaum & Oltmanns, 
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1992; Halari et al., 2006), social anhedonia (Berenbaum & Oltmanns, 1992), and other 
experiences such as anxiety, anger, and fatigue (Halari et al., 2006).  
The research available suggests that individuals with schizophrenia can perceive 
and report on their current emotional experience without stimulus induction, and are 
reliable and valid reporters of this experience (Kring & Capongrio, 2010) with their 
report correlating with clinician-ratings following semi-structured interview (Halari et al., 
2006).  While it appears that schizophrenia may be characterized by more baseline 
negative affect (e.g. depression), this conclusion should be interpreted with caution 
because: (1) this area of research is limited; (2) much of the methodological focus is on 
negative affect.   
In sum, there is strong evidence that the “emotional system” in schizophrenia is 
intact, although memory of the “in-the-moment” emotions may be inaccurate when 
reported some time later (Ursu et al., 2011), a phenomenon not restricted to patients with 
schizophrenia.   
Thought Disorder In Affective and  
Non-Schizophrenic Psychotic Disorders 
 
While thought disorder is considered a core feature of schizophrenia, it also 
occurs at a similar rate in individuals with bipolar disorder I (Andreasen, 1979b; 
Andreasen & Grove, 1986; Harrow et al., 1982; Harvey et a., 1990; Harvey et al., 1984; 
Holzman et al., 1986; Levy et al., 2010; Marengo & Harrow, 1985), and schizoaffective 
disorder (Andreasen & Grove, 1986; Holzman et al., 1986), albeit more associated with 
positive thought disorder in mania (Andreasen & Grove, 1986; Harvey & Brault, 1986; 
Harvey et al., 1990; Harvey et al, 1984; Jampala et al., 1989; Taylor et al., 1994).  
Furthermore, research suggests that thought disorder in mania is often more severe in 
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acute stages (Harrow et al., 1982; Jampala et al., 1989; Marengo & Harrow, 1985) and 
interestingly, thought disorder in SADm looks more similar to thought disorder in 
schizophrenia than to mania in acute stages (Holzman et al., 1986).  However, 
examination of thought disorder longitudinally suggests that thought disorder remits 
almost completely in mania (Andreasen & Grove, 1986; Jampala et al., 1989) and 
somewhat in schizoaffective disorder (Andreasen & Grove, 1986; Marengo & Harrow, 
1997), including significantly greater reductions overall in mania compared to 
schizophrenia (Harrow et al., 1982).  While evaluated in several studies, findings 
regarding thought disorder and depression were often only vaguely discussed or 
neglected altogether.  
Similar to thought disorder research in schizophrenia, authors speculate about the 
potential role of affective processes in the manifestation of thought disorder in mania by 
implicating excessive affect (Andreasen, 1979b), distress and anxiety (Harrow et al., 
1986b) and emotional intensity (Harrow et al., 1986a) in the positive elements of thought 
disorder often associated with mania.  The speculations about schizoaffective disorder are 
even more ambiguous, with discussion of the heterogeneous and “transitional” nature of 
the diagnosis (Andreasen & Grove, 1986, p. 358) and the suggestion that the combination 
of thought disorder, psychosis, and affective states may implicate a meaningful pattern 
for schizoaffective disorder, specifically (Marengo & Harrow, 1997).     
One area that is critical when considering the similarities in the acute phase and 
longitudinal differences in thought disorder between individuals with schizophrenia and 
those with mania or schizoaffective disorder is pharmacological treatments.  However, 
intergroup medication differences are not statistically explored in any of the 
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aforementioned studies; only medicated versus unmedicated intragroup differences were 
examined.  With regard to the current argument for the role of affect in thought disorder, 
this information is significant when considering that a large majority of those with mania 
in the aforementioned studies received lithium (a mood stabilizer) or lithium combined 
with antipsychotic medication at follow-up (see Table 3).  One study reported significant 
remission of thought disorder in mania over seven weeks when compared to individuals 
with schizophrenia who received antipsychotic medication only (Harrow et al., 1982).  
However, another study showed no difference in severity at one-year follow-up despite 
differences in medication (Harrow et al., 1986a).  Unfortunately, other studies that 
exhibited differences in remission rates between those with mania and schizophrenia did 
not discuss specific differences in pharmacological treatment (Andreasen & Grove, 1986; 
Jampala et al., 1989).  Additional support for the role of affect in thought disorder in 
schizophrenia is illustrated by the findings from Marengo & Harrow (1997) that showed 
a negative correlation for thought disorder symptoms and anti-depressant medication for 
the total sample at baseline, and for schizophrenia only at two-year follow-up.  However, 
no specific information was provided about sample characteristics or other 
pharmacological treatments for those receiving the anti-depressant medication. 
Subsamples of studies primarily focused on the role of psychosis in thought 
disorder have examined thought disorder in schizophrenia, psychotic but non-
schizophrenic (PNS), and nonpsychotic groups (NP) (Harrow & Marengo, 1986; Harrow 
et al., 1986b; Marengo & Harrow, 1985; Marengo & Harrow, 1997) (see Table 3 for the 
diagnoses included in these categories).  While literature discussed earlier illustrated 
inconsistent results regarding the relationship between psychosis and thought disorder, 
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this subsample of research suggested that thought disorder is more severe in 
schizophrenia than PNS (Marengo & Harrow, 1985), and both PNS and NP at acute 
stages (Harrow et al., 1986b) and 1.8 years after discharge (Harrow et al., 1986b).  
Moreover, thought disorder was more persistent in schizophrenia than in schizoaffective 
disorder, PNS, and NP groups, and more prevalent than in PNS and NP across 7.5-year 
follow-up.  Thought disorder in schizoaffective disorder was also more prevalent than in 
NP groups (Marengo & Harrow, 1997).  However, Harrow & Marengo (1986) found no 
difference between schizophrenia and PNS at 1.5-2 year follow-up, or 3.5-4 year follow-
up.  Both of these groups showed more severe thought disorder than NP at 1.5-2 year 
follow-up.  Not only do these findings echo the inconsistent results discussed previously, 
the methodologies also fail to consider the impact of affect, as PNS and NP samples were 
heterogeneous with regard to affective states (see Table 3).  PNS groups were primarily 
comprised of individuals with major depression, mania, and schizoaffective disorder with 
both depressed and manic subtypes, and NP groups were similarly comprised of 
individuals with major depression, dysthymia and mania (Harrow & Marengo, 1986; 
Harrow et al., 1986b; Marengo & Harrow, 1997).  While the studies did acknowledge the 
role of pharmacological treatments on psychosis by providing frequencies for 
antipsychotic medication, these studies provided no discussion of anti-depressants or 
mood stabilizers, treatments that were likely present given the samples used. 
Although the prevalence of thought disorder in affective disorders illustrates that 
thought disorder is not unique to schizophrenia, findings suggest that the course and 
prognosis of thought disorder is often different in individuals with affective disorders and 
schizoaffective disorders than schizophrenia; research further suggests that thought 
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disorder is more state-dependent in mania and trait-dependent in schizophrenia (Levy et 
al., 2010).  This may be, in part, due to the differences in interventions implemented for 
individuals with schizophrenia and those with affective disorders.  Antipsychotic 
medication is the preferred treatment for individuals with schizophrenia (Kuller, Ott, 
Goisman, Wainwright, & Rabin, 2010), an intervention that targets the neurological 
dysfunction associated with hallucinations and delusions.  However, while these 
psychotic symptoms respond well to this particular treatment, research discussed earlier 
suggests thought disorder remains persistent and chronic.  On the other hand, the research 
discussed above suggests that lithium is the preferred treatment for mania, and 
individuals in the aforementioned studies experienced remission in thought disorder 
while receiving this particular treatment.  While there is no direct discussion of the 
impact of mood stabilizers or anti-depressant medication on thought disorder, the breadth 
of research described above implicates, although indirectly, a relationship between affect 
and thought disorder that may be extrapolated to schizophrenia.  Differences in the course 
of thought disorder in affective disorders, coupled with consideration of pharmacological 
and psychotherapeutic interventions that may impact the remission of thought disorder in 
affective groups suggests that affect may not only be implicated in the severity, 
presentation, and chronicity of thought disorder in schizophrenia but is also a likely target 
for treatment.  Research further suggests that a history of affective symptoms is a good 
prognostic indicator in psychiatric illness, generally (Keefe et al., 1987; Marengo & 
Harrow, 1997).  While this conclusion speaks to the remission of thought disorder in 
affective disorders, this further suggests that more consideration must be given to affect 
in schizophrenia to better understand if better prognosis is related to early intervention for 
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significant affective symptoms and, if so, what this could mean for symptoms of 
schizophrenia. 
Review of Methodological Critiques 
Course of Literature   
While not explicitly discussed in the review thus far, it appears that, though 
relevant and significant, much of the seminal research in thought disorder in 
schizophrenia is over two decades old.  This may be due to several factors: (1) more 
current research uses different terms or conceptualizations of thought disorder (e.g., 
speech disorder or dysphasia); (2) thought disorder is an indicator of positive symptoms 
and should therefore respond to interventions in the same fashion; (3) the endophenotypic 
nature of thought disorder in schizophrenia contributes to less concern about symptom 
remission and more concern about symptom management; and/or (4) there is an 
uncertainty of where to go from here given the rich history of thought disorder, and the 
myriad of formulations and the apparent absence of a consensus view.  Furthermore, the 
tendency to simply infer emotional experience from negative symptoms (i.e., negative 
emotion or no emotion), an assertion that has been refuted (Kring et al., 1993; Malla, 
1995), and the failure to appreciate the differences in experienced versus expressed 
emotion have likely contributed to the difficulty in pursuing new perspectives such as the 
one proposed in the current research. 
Methodology 
 Measurement variability may have also created a challenge to pursuing a better 
understanding of thought disorder.  For example, extensive results from the CFS indicate 
that limited or no responding suggests absence of thought disorder while the TLC asserts 
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that this type of response is indicative of severe poverty of speech.  Moreover, different 
definitions of thought disorder across assessment procedures appear to represent 
differences in conceptualization with the highest rating on the TLC being representative 
of frequency and incomprehensibility of speech, compared to the highest rating on the 
Thought Disorder Index (TDI; Johnston & Holzman, 1979; Johnston et al., 1986) and the 
Thought and Language Index (TLI; Liddle et al., 2002) indicating a complete loss of 
reality.  The variability in these three areas has yet to be accounted for by previous 
literature. 
 The use of RDC (Spitzer et al., 1978) versus DSM (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1980; 1994; 2000) diagnostic criteria also presents a methodological 
problem.  As the more stringent of the two, RDC states that a diagnosis of schizophrenia 
implies no affective disturbance at any time during the illness, with the presence of even 
a brief episode earning a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder.  This is quite different 
from DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980), DSM-IV (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994), and DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria 
that allow for a prominent affective disturbance in schizophrenia as long as it is brief.  
Differences in the use of diagnostic criteria may result in a comparison of different 
samples of schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder, limiting the ability for a consensus 
view. 
 Another major criticism of the thought disorder literature, particularly as it relates 
to the proposed moderating relationship of affect on the severity and presentation of 
thought disorder in schizophrenia, is the limited acknowledgment and possible effects of 
medication.  Intragroup differences in medicated versus unmedicated states were 
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addressed at times, but no differences between classes of medication were examined (i.e., 
antipsychotic medication versus mood stabilizer).  This is particularly important given 
that different types of medication target different physiological mechanisms, and that 
failing to acknowledge the different interventions that comparison groups receive not 
only presents a potential confound but also does not take into account the possible 
benefits of treatment in one group (affective disorders and schizoaffective disorder) for a 
shared mechanism that may impact thought processes across groups (i.e., affect).   
Research Samples 
The samples utilized in the aforementioned studies are also somewhat 
problematic.  The heterogeneous samples used in many of the CFS studies (i.e. PNS, NP) 
control for psychosis but do not acknowledge the affective components likely at play 
given the composition of the samples, particularly with regard to valence and intensity of 
affect and differences in pharmacological treatments.  Moreover, detailed examination of 
schizoaffective disorder has the potential to be very useful.  However, schizoaffective 
disorder was only examined individually in three of the studies reviewed and in others 
was included within the PNS grouping in the CFS project (see Table 3), or not discussed.  
While the exclusion of schizoaffective disorder in these procedures allows for a clean 
examination of thought disorder in schizophrenia and affective groups, it reflects an 
implicit disregard for the continuum of affective impairment that links these three 
diagnostic groups.  Finally, the samples described are primarily inpatient samples so they 
are not representative of the respective diagnoses and limit the generalizability to 
individuals in other stages of the illness. 
Conclusions and Hypotheses 
	  	   37 
 Affect may contribute to the severity and presentation of acute thought disorder 
and may be implicated in the persistence of thought disorder in schizophrenia, a 
conceptualization similarly proposed by Andreasen in her early attempts to quantify 
thought disorder (1979b).  Findings from the affect and cognition literature support a 
relationship between affective intensity and valence, and manifestation of thought 
disorder.  Following from findings illustrating that positive affect contributes to broad, 
top-down processing and negative affect leads to narrow, bottom-up processing, it is 
hypothesized that positive affect will contribute to thought disorder elements indicative 
of broad, but loose cognitions, and negative affect will contribute to narrow, restricted 
responding.  It can also be hypothesized that affective intensity would impact thought 
disorder in schizophrenia in a fashion similar to the widespread impact that intense 
affective experiences have on all individuals from normal to those suffering from severe 
psychopathology: significant, pervasive disruption and worsening of symptoms in a 
variety of domains.   
Current Hypotheses 
 While the study of thought disorder in schizophrenia has seen decades of 
research, we have only limited knowledge about the factors that contribute to the 
heterogeneous severity and presentation of this impairment.  The earlier review suggests 
that affect may play a significant role in thought disorder in schizophrenia and 
schizophrenia-spectrum disorders (e.g. schizoaffective disorder).  However, there is 
limited research in the area of baseline affective experience, and affect and thought 
disorder, leaving only speculations about this relationship.  Therefore, the study of the 
relationship between thought disorder and affect in schizophrenia requires examination of 
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the most basic questions related to affective intensity and valence, and thought disorder 
severity.  While significant questions also remain regarding assessment and 
understanding of affective experience in schizophrenia, the current research seeks to 
examine thought disorder and the role that affect may play, and not affective experience 
per se.  
Hypothesis 1. While affect intensity and valence are both thought to contribute to 
the severity of thought disorder, it is hypothesized that affect intensity is a more 
significant factor in the severity of thought disorder in schizophrenia and schizoaffective 
disorder.  Affect intensity has shown to be related to impairment in a variety of cognitive 
processes across individuals and affective valence (Basso, Shefft, & Hoffmann, 1994; 
Larsen & Diener, 1987).  Two hypotheses will be tested to address this larger hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1a. Self-reported global affect intensity (positive and negative items 
combined) as measured by the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS, Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) will be predictive of thought disorder severity as measured by 
the TDI total score.  
Hypothesis 1b. Positive and negative valence components of the PANAS will 
differentially contribute to thought disorder severity (TDI total score).  It is hypothesized 
that the intensity of positive affect will account for more variance in thought disorder 
severity than negative affect.  This hypothesis follows research that suggests that positive 
affect, when coupled with high affective intensity, may impair cognitive processes 
(Basso, Shefft, & Hoffman, 1994).  
Hypothesis 2. Self-reported intensity of positive and negative affect as measured 
by the PANAS will differentially relate to response categories from the TDI.  
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Specifically, positive affect will be related to categories that reflect broader, more 
associative processing, while negative affect will be related to categories that reflect 
narrowed processing.  See Table 4 for definitions of the response categories for each 
severity level on the TDI.  This hypothesis seeks to explore robust findings from the 
literature regarding the relationship between positive affect and broad, top-down 
processing, and negative affect and narrow, bottom-up processing (Bar, 2009; Clore & 
Palmer, 2009; Fredrickson, 2001), albeit at the more extreme and impaired end of an 
implied continuum. Two hypotheses will be tested to address this broader hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 2a.  Positive and negative affect as measured by the PANAS will be 
related to exemplars of broad versus narrow processing from the TDI.  Sixteen categories 
were chosen to explore this hypothesis; nine were selected for positive affect and seven 
for negative affect. 
Hypothesis 2b.  Using all of the response categories from the TDI, significant 
factors will be identified using exploratory factor analyses that reflect broad versus 
narrow processing.  These factors will be significantly related to positive and negative 
affect as measured by the PANAS.
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METHODS 
 
Sample 
Individuals eligible to participate in the study met the following inclusion criteria: 
(1) Axis I diagnosis of schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder as indicated from the 
patient chart; (2) currently residing in an acute inpatient hospital; (3) native English 
speaker; and (4) able to provide informed consent.  Patients were excluded if they had: 
(1) an Axis I diagnosis of delirium, or Alzheimer’s or Vascular dementia; (2) an Axis II 
diagnosis of mental retardation; (3) an Axis III diagnosis of traumatic brain injury; (4) 
other known medical, neurological, or cognitive conditions that are suspected of 
significantly affecting thinking, behavior, or one’s ability to complete study measures; 
and (5) hearing or visual impairments without corrective treatment.  Because this study 
was formulated as an examination of thought disorder and affect within schizophrenia 
and schizoaffective disorder and not a study of diagnosis, no control group was used.   
Measures 
 Individuals who agreed to participate and from whom consent was obtained 
completed the following self-report measures: sociodemographic form and Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS).  Participants were also administered the Rorschach 
Inkblot Test and responses to each of the 10 stimulus cards were used to assess thought 
disorder severity using the TDI.   
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Sociodemographic form. The following sociodemographic data was identified 
through thorough review of the medical chart and confirmed by the patient, with the 
understanding that information from the medical chart was determined as the most 
accurate in light of any discrepancies given the extensive medical and psychiatric 
information obtained by the unit social workers:  
1. Age 
2. Sex 
3. Ethnicity 
4. Race 
5. Diagnosis 
6. Marital Status 
7. Educational attainment  
8. Employment status  
9. Employment history  
10. Current living status 
11. Current medications  
12. Medication adherence  
13. Medical history 
14. Number of previous hospitalizations 
15. Other current treatment  
16. Age of first hospitalizations 
17. Age of first episode  
18. Duration of illness (current age – age at first hospitalization) 
19. Family psychiatric history 
20. Substance abuse history 
 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. The Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) is 20-item self-report measure of 
positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA).  Ten exemplars each of positive and 
negative affect are rated on a 5-point likert scale: 1 (very slightly or not at all) – 5 (very 
much).  Indices of PA include attentive, interested, alert, excited, enthusiastic, inspired, 
proud, determined, strong, and active.  Indices of NA include 2 items across five 
categories: (a) distress (distressed, upset), (b) angry (hostile, irritable), (c) fearful (scared, 
afraid), (d) guilty (ashamed, guilty), and (e) jittery (nervous, jittery).  Participants are 
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asked to rate “ to what extent” they have experienced each exemplar for a given span of 
time determined a priori by the examiner (e.g. “you feel this way right now, at the present 
moment,”  “you have felt this way today,” “you have felt this way during the past week,” 
“you generally feel this way, that is, how you feel on the average”).  The current study 
asked participants to rate their experience of each of the 20 items “at the present 
moment.”  This time instruction was determined most appropriate given research 
regarding the difficulty of individuals with schizophrenia in identifying emotional states 
or experiences retrospectively or following even a short delay (Gold, 2011; Ursu et al., 
2011).  Furthermore, it is expected that affect at the time of thought disorder assessment 
is the most likely to be related to TDI.  A completed PANAS provides a global intensity 
score determined by the summed ratings across all 20 exemplars (range of 20-100), and 
an intensity score for PA and NA (range of 10 – 50, respectively). 
The ten exemplars of positive and negative affect included in this measure were 
identified through principle components analysis of 60-items identified by Zevon & 
Tellegen (1982).  Watson et al. (1988) determined items as exemplars of positive or 
negative affect with loadings of  .40 or higher on the relevant factor and <0.25 on the 
other factor.  The PANAS has shown strong reliability in healthy adults with intraclass 
correlations for PA ranging from .86 - .90 and .84 - .87 for NA, and in a psychiatric 
inpatient sample with correlations of .85 and .91 for PA and NA, respectively (Watson et 
al., 1988).  The correlation across scales is low for both samples with -.12 - -.23 for the 
healthy sample and -.27 for the psychiatric sample, suggesting independent scales. These 
reliability estimates have been shown to be unrelated to the time instructions used (“this 
moment;” “today;” “past few days;” “week;” “past few weeks;” “year;” “general, on 
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average”).  Test-retest reliability data in healthy individuals shows stability across 
administrations as well as increased stability over longer time frames (i.e. “today” versus 
“over the last year”) (Watson et al., 1988).  Construct validity analyses revealed that PA 
is negatively correlated across time frames with measures of distress and dysfunction, 
depression, and responses to stressful and aversive events, with scores ranging from -.19 - 
-.36.  Conversely, NA was positively correlated with all of the aforementioned measures 
with scores ranging from .51 - .74 (Watson et al., 1988). 
Thought Disorder Index (TDI). The Thought Disorder Index (TDI, Johnston & 
Holzman, 1979; Johnson et al., 1986) is used to identify and rate the severity of thinking 
disturbances.  Using verbatim responses from the Rorschach Inkblot Test (Rorschach, 
1942), the TDI assesses thought disorder on a scale of severity from 0.25 (minor 
idiosyncrasies) – 1.0 (complete loss of reality).  For use with the TDI, the Rorschach is 
administered using Rapaport instructions (Rapaport, Gill, & Schafer, 1968), which allows 
for inquiry after each card rather than after all ten cards have been shown as is required in 
other scoring systems (e.g. Exner scoring system, Exner, 1993).  While the TDI may be 
used with any assessment that provides a verbal sample such as the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (WAIS, Wechsler, 2008) or a semi-structured clinical interview, the 
Rorschach offers many advantages over alternative tests given the novelty of the task and 
its unstructured format.  The design of the Rorschach allows for greater likelihood of 
thought disorder when compared to other assessments that are comprised of standardized 
questions that likely result in stereotypic responses (Holzman et al., 2005).  Furthermore, 
research has also shown that the TDI, when used with the Rorschach, is a valid indicator 
of thought disorder in schizophrenia and shows significant incremental validity in 
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predicting future psychotic symptoms when added to a clinical interview (Lilienfeld, 
Wood, & Garb, 2000).   
A score of 0.25 (minor idiosyncrasies) is given for responses that would be only 
rarely noticed in normal conversation but would likely become increasingly unclear 
following an accumulation of such responses.  A score of 0.5 (distinct oddness) is given 
for responses that reflect an idiosyncratic and odd response style, albeit not bizarre.  
These responses may occur with moderate frequency in normal conversation but would 
be unlikely to suggest loss of contact with reality.  A score of 0.75 is given for responses 
that clearly illustrate disordered thought.  Exemplars of this level reflect instability in 
thinking and perceiving, and bizarre, absurd responses.  At the 1.0 level, responses are 
significantly disordered and appear to reflect a complete loss of contact with reality.  
Within each level of severity are categories of characteristic responses that allow for both 
qualitative and quantitative information.  See Table 4 for response categories for each 
level of severity and definitions of each category.  Severity of thought disorder as 
indicated by total TDI score is calculated using the following equation,  
Σ[0.25(A) + 0.50(B) + 0.75(C) + 1.0(D)]   x 100 
          Total R 
 
where A is the number of responses at the 0.25 level, B is the number of responses at the 
0.50 level, C is the number of responses at the 0.75 level, D is the number of responses at 
the 1.0 level, and R is the total number of Rorschach responses.  A total TDI score is 
derived by the sum of each instance of thought disorder weighted by its severity level and 
divided by the number of total responses to control for verbal production.  This value is 
then multiplied by 100 and expressed as a percentage of thought disorder severity.   
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For each stimulus card from the Rorschach, a score is given for each response 
where it appears thought disorder is exhibited.  In addition, only one score is given per 
individual response within a stimulus card and the score is chosen based on that which 
best captures the process that appears evident in the response.  A scored protocol 
provides the frequency of responses for each exemplar, number of responses at each level 
of severity, the number of responses for each category, and a thought disorder severity 
total score (Johnston et al., 1986).  
Everyone involved in the administration and scoring of the TDI in the current 
study has completed extensive training followed by regular follow-up meetings to 
maintain skills.  For the current administration, all responses were tape-recorded and then 
transcribed for scoring purposes.  Transcribed responses were retained, de-identified, for 
later analysis.  Each completed protocol was scored by a group of at least three trained 
researchers. 
 The use of the Rorschach with the TDI for measuring thought disorder has shown 
good internal consistency using the Spearman-Brown formula with a value of .78 
(Johnston & Holzman, 1979).  In addition, reliability analyses have shown strong inter-
rater reliability for individual and group raters across varying levels of psychopathology.  
Johnston and Holzman (1979) found strong inter-rater reliability for TDI total score with 
two independent raters for a sample of individuals with schizophrenia (r = .90), 
nonpsychotic patients (r = .93) and nonpsychiatric controls (r = .82).  Similarly, Solovay, 
Shenton, and Holzman (1987) examined a sample of individuals with schizophrenia, 
bipolar disorder and healthy controls, and showed strong inter-rater reliability using the 
Spearman-Brown formula for two independent raters for TDI total score (r = .89), 
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severity level (r = .79), and categories (r = .81).  Coleman et al. (1993) used four 
independent teams of raters to examine thought disorder severity in a sample of 
individuals with schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, or bipolar disorder, as well as 
first-degree relatives of these patients.  Coleman et al. (1993) found strong inter-rater 
reliability for TDI total scores ranging from rs = .80 to .90.  Furthermore, Coleman et al. 
(1993) showed intraclass correlations of .77, .72, and .77 for levels 0.25, 0.5, and 0.75, 
respectively (there were not enough responses at the 1.0 level to calculate reliability), and 
intraclass correlations of .58, .76, and .86 for idiosyncratic verbalizations, combinatory 
thinking, and irrelevant intrusions, respectively (these were the only categories for which 
there were enough instances to calculate reliability).   
 Developers of the TDI determined that a valid measure of thought disorder should 
distinguish between individuals with schizophrenia, acutely disturbed nonpsychotic 
individuals, and healthy controls (Johnston & Holzman, 1979).  Research using the TDI 
with the Rorschach has shown that the TDI can distinguish schizophrenia and bipolar 
disorder in adolescent and adult samples using principal component factor analytic 
procedures (Makowski et al., 1997; Solovay et al., 1987), and is an effective tool for 
identifying other disorders on the schizophrenia spectrum such as schizoaffective 
disorder and schizotypy (Coleman, Levy, Lenzenweger, & Holzman, 1996; Holzman et 
al., 1995).    
Procedures 
 Recruitment.  The current project was approved by the director of nursing on the 
inpatient unit at the University of Louisville Hospital, as well as the University of 
Louisville and the University of Louisville Hospital Institutional Review Board.  
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Information was provided to all staff on the inpatient unit to describe the purpose and 
procedures of the study, as well as any assistance from the staff that might have been 
necessary.  All recruitment took place on the unit.  Participants were first identified for 
eligibility by reviewing diagnoses relevant to the inclusion and exclusion criteria, and 
confirming their ability to participate with the unit nurse; permission for this information 
was obtained through a partial waiver approved by the University of Louisville Hospital 
Institutional Review Board.  Potential participants were approached to inquire about their 
interest in participating in the current study.  
Individuals identified as being eligible for the study were given pertinent study 
information, including why the study was being conducted, and risks, benefits, 
confidentiality, and payment.  Following that, individuals were told the following: “If 
you choose to participate in this study I will be asking you to answer some questions 
about yourself and how you are currently feeling.  I will also ask you to answer questions 
about a set of pictures.”  Individuals were informed that their verbal responses would be 
tape-recorded for transcription and that responses would be retained, de-identified, for 
later analyses.  Finally, individuals were told that all data would be coded with a 
participant identification number that will be secured separately with each participant’s 
identifying information (i.e. name, age, race, and date of birth).  Participants had the 
opportunity to ask any additional questions and were given the option to proceed through 
the informed consent process, consider participating with the option to proceed with 
informed consent and participation at a later time, or decline participation altogether.  
Because the average length of stay on this particular unit is six days, all attempts were 
made to conduct testing on the day interested patients provided consent to do so.  For 
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participants who requested a break or who were interrupted by a unit activity, testing was 
completed within 24 hours of the stopping point. 
 Informed consent.  Individuals who expressed interest in study participation 
were introduced to the informed consent process.  Each individual who provided consent 
was assessed for understanding of the consenting process and the requirements of 
participation.  The following questions were required to be answered such that an 
adequate level of understanding was observed: (a) “What are you being asked to do as a 
participant in this project;” (b) “Who should you ask if you have questions about any part 
of the project;” (c) “What would you do if you were experiencing distress or discomfort 
during the study;” and (d) “Do you have to participate?”   
After consent was obtained, each participant was briefed about the hospital 
HIPAA policy and asked to sign a form indicating their understanding of the policy and 
how their protected health information may be used.  Following signing the HIPAA form, 
the participant’s medical chart was reviewed to further determine eligibility.       
 Completion of measures.  Administration of screening and assessment 
instruments is standard procedure on most inpatient psychiatric units, including 
University of Louisville Hospital.  Therefore, it was not expected that completion of the 
measures for the current study would cause significant disruption for patients or staff, or 
the daily routine of the milieu.  Moreover, screening and assessment done currently on 
this unit is usually not considered invasive or above minimal risk by patients or staff.   
 A majority of the socio-demographic information was obtained from the patient.  
Additional information was obtained and/or corroborated from the patient’s chart, as 
needed.  Following consent for participation and completing the socio-demographic 
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questionnaire, each participant was administered the Rorschach and asked to fill out the 
PANAS.  Patients with reading difficulties had the PANAS read to them.  The order of 
administration of these assessments was counterbalanced across participants to control 
for any order effects.  Following the administration of all measures, participants were 
engaged in a short, neutral conversation to provide a distraction from any distress that 
may have been caused by the study items.  The average length of time for completion 
was approximately 1.5 hours.  
Data Analyses 
 Descriptive analyses.  Descriptive analyses were completed for all variables 
using IBM SPSS Statistics 20.  Correlation analyses were conducted for the following 
socio-demographic variables, and PANAS scores and the TDI total score to explore 
statistically significant relationships: age, days in the hospital, years of education, age at 
first psychiatric episode, age at first hospitalization, number of hospitalizations, and 
duration of illness.  Other socio-demographic variables were not analyzed due to large 
sample size discrepancies across variable categories. 
Hypothesis 1a. 
Simple regression analysis.  Simple regression analysis was used to examine the 
relation between affect intensity from the PANAS and total thought disorder score from 
the TDI.  Global intensity level was summed across all 20 PA and NA exemplars from 
the PANAS, yielding a range of 20-100.  Significant findings were determined using α = 
.05. 
 Hypothesis 1b.   
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 Multiple regression analysis.  Multiple regression analysis was conducted to 
examine the variance in TDI total scores explained by intensity of positive and negative 
affect from the PANAS.  PA and NA were determined by summing the intensity ratings 
for the 10 exemplars for PA and NA, respectively.  To make the component ranges 
comparable to the global intensity range, each summed component score was multiplied 
by two, yielding a possible range of scores from 20-100.  Pearson’s correlation analysis 
was used to check for multicollinearity.  A correlation of r < .80 was used as the cut-off 
for determining the appropriateness of using a pair of variables as independent predictors 
in the multiple regression analysis in accordance with recommendations by Field (2009) 
as well a collinearity diagnostics from the regression analyses.  The total TDI score was 
the criterion variable.  Both the overall model and the fit of each predictor were explored.  
The forced-entry method was used to evaluate the relative significance of intensity of 
positive affect and intensity of negative affect.  This method was chosen over other 
methods, as it is most appropriate for theory testing and less influenced by random 
variation that could impact the replicability of findings (Field, 2009).  
 Hypothesis 2a. 
Correlation analysis.  Pearson’s correlation analysis was used to examine the 
relation of indices of PA and NA from the PANAS with instances of broad versus narrow 
cognitive processing from the TDI to further explore the association between affect and 
cognitive processing hypothesized in the literature (Bar, 2009; Clore & Palmer, 2009; 
Fredrickson, 2001).  The PA and NA variables were determined by the sum of the ratings 
across each of the 10 exemplars, respectively.  Cognitive processing was examined with 
response categories from the TDI that are characteristic of broad versus narrow 
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processing. Exemplars from the 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75 severity levels that demonstrate 
broad and narrow processing were chosen a priori based on extensive descriptions from 
Johnston and Holzman (1979) and Holzman et al. (2005).  The response categories for 
broad processing included clang, relationship verbalization, idiosyncratic symbolism, 
looseness, fabulized combinations, playful confabulations, fluidity, confabulations, and 
flippancy.  Narrow processing was explored using inappropriate distance, vagueness, 
word-finding difficulties, perseveration, incongruous combinations, fragmentation, and 
autistic logic.  Categories not used in this analysis are thought to show greater variability 
in processing and could theoretically reflect broad or narrow processing depending on the 
response.  No categories were chosen from the 1.0 level due to the infrequency of 
response types at that level.  The TDI scores for each exemplar used in the correlation 
analysis reflect a proportion, determined by the frequency of the exemplar divided by the 
total number of responses (R) for each individual.  Significant relationships were 
determined using α = .05.  
Hypothesis 2b. 
Exploratory factor analysis. In addition to examining the relation between affect 
and cognitive processing using a set of exemplars determined a priori, an exploratory 
factor analysis (EFA) was hypothesized to quantitatively determine if response categories 
from the TDI load on a set of factors that reflect broad versus narrow cognitive 
processing that may, in turn, be related to PA and NA.  However, the data collected did 
not allow this analysis to be conducted.  See Results section for continued explanation. 
Participant Sample and Statistical Power 
	  	   52 
G*Power 3.1 (Erdfelder, Faul, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) was used to calculate the 
sample size necessary to conduct the proposed analyses.  Standard Cohen’s d effect sizes 
were used to calculate power analyses given the wide range of effect sizes seen in the 
literature (i.e. Cohen & Minor, 2010).  Given an alpha level = .05, estimated power = .80, 
two predictors, and a standard medium effect size of f2 = .15, the estimated sample size 
necessary for multiple regression analysis is 68 participants.  This estimation is more 
stringent than the rule of thumb described by Field (2009) that suggests 10-15 cases for 
each predictor, which in this case would recommend 20-30 participants.  To examine 
correlation analyses, G*Power suggests a sample of 84 participants when using an alpha 
level = .05, estimated power = .80, and a medium effect size of r = .30.  
While Field (2009) describes rules of thumb for estimating sample size when 
using EFA such as 10-15 participants per variable, or 5-10 participants per variable up to 
a total of 300, research has shown it is ultimately the factor loadings that are of the 
utmost importance when establishing the fit of a particular model (Field, 2009; Winter, 
Dodou, & Wieringa, 2009).  Winter et al. (2009) reported that lower sample sizes are 
satisfactory when factor loadings and the number of variables are high, and when the 
number of factors is small.  For example, a model specifying factor loadings of .4, two 
factors, and 24 variables estimated a sample size of 134, compared to a model specifying 
factor loadings of .6, two factors, and 24 variables that estimated a sample size of 34.  
Given the difficulty recruiting clinical samples and the variability in the patient sample 
on the inpatient unit at any given time (potentially limiting recruitment of individual with 
schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder), more stringent guidelines will be used for 
factor loadings, allowing for a smaller sample.   
	  	   53 
Taken together, a sample range of 20-84 participants was deemed acceptable to 
address the aforementioned hypotheses and associated analyses. The elimination of the 
EFA from the current study did not change the estimated sample size needed.  This range 
represents the floor and ceiling of the sample size estimation, with anything lower than 
20 yielding questionable power and anything above 84 unlikely to add additional power.
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RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Analyses 
 The current sample is comprised of twenty-four inpatients with a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder .  See Table 5 for descriptive sample 
information.  Table 6 includes the mean, standard deviation, and range information for 
the criterion and predictor variables: PANAS total score, PANAS NA, PANAS, PA, and 
total TDI score.  The mean total TDI score for the current sample was comparable to 
other studies reviewed, albeit somewhat higher (M = 40.62, SD = 35.85). In a sample of 
inpatients and outpatients with functional psychosis, bipolar disorder, personality 
disorder, and first-degree relatives with psychosis, mean TDI total scores were 24.05 (SD 
= 28.74) for one sample and 22.56 (SD = 27.38) for another (Carpenter et al., 1993).  
Coleman et al. (1993) examined twenty protocols from a sample of inpatients with 
schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, and bipolar disorder.  Four separate rating teams 
found mean TDI total scores of 35.25 (SD = 50.20), 22.78 (SD = 30.06), 37.92 (SD = 
47.29), and 18.79 (SD = 29.15), respectively.  Holzman et al. (1986) found a mean TDI 
score of 34.60 (SD = 38.80) for a sample of inpatients with schizophrenia and 22.80 (SD 
= 21.40) for schizoaffective disorder.  The range presented in Table 6 is also comparable 
to and falls within the ranges found by four different scoring groups in Coleman et al. 
(1993).   
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The following variables from the socio-demographic form were analyzed for their 
relations with the predictor and criterion variables: age, days in the hospital, years of 
education, age at first psychiatric episode, age at first hospitalization, number of 
hospitalizations, and duration of illness.  Other socio-demographic variables were not 
analyzed due to large sample size discrepancies across variable categories.  Spearman’s 
correlations were used for this analysis due to non-normal distributions of all the 
aforementioned socio-demographic variables.  See Table 7 for the correlation coefficients 
for the PANAS and TDI variables, and each of the socio-demographic variables, as well 
correlation coefficients across the socio-demographic variables.  There were no 
significant correlations between any of the socio-demographic variables and PANAS and 
TDI scores.  Age at the time of testing was positively correlated with age at first 
psychotic episode, age at first hospitalization, and duration of illness.  Age at first 
psychiatric episode was positively related to age at first hospitalization.   
Hypothesis 1 
 Hypothesis 1a. Pearson correlation analyses were conducted for the PANAS total 
score and the total TDI score; affective intensity as measured by the PANAS total score 
was positively correlated with thought disorder severity as measured by the total TDI 
score (see Table 8).  Simple regression analysis was conducted to examine the hypothesis 
that affective intensity predicts thought disorder severity.  PANAS total score was a 
significant predictor of TDI total score and accounted for 40% of the variance in thought 
disorder severity, R = .408, F(1,23) = 4.39, p < .05. 
 Hypothesis 1b. Pearson correlation analyses were conducted for the PANAS PA 
and PANAS NA scores and the total TDI score to examine the differential contribution of 
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positive and negative affect in thought disorder severity.  No multicollinearity was 
demonstrated between PA and NA, r = -.074.  Neither positive nor negative affect was 
significantly associated with thought disorder severity (see Table 8).  While a 
conventional significance level was approached, multiple regression analysis examining 
positive and negative affect as predictors of thought disorder severity was not significant, 
R = .412, F(1,23) = 2.14, p = .142.  
Hypothesis 2 
 Hypothesis 2a. Pearson correlation analysis was conducted for PANAS PA and 
PANAS NA, and exemplars of broad, associative processing and narrow processing, 
respectively.  The following exemplars were chosen a priori as indicators of broad, 
associative processing: clang, relationship verbalization, idiosyncratic symbolism, 
looseness, fabulized combinations, playful confabulations, fluidity, confabulations, and 
flippancy.  There was a significant negative correlation for positive affect and fabulized 
combinations (see Table 9).  The following exemplars were chosen a priori as indicators 
of narrow processing: inappropriate distance, vagueness, word-finding difficulties, 
perseveration, incongruous combinations, fragmentation, and autistic logic.  There was a 
significant positive correlation for negative affect and autistic logic (see Table 10). 
 Pearson correlations were also examined for PANAS NA and fabulized 
combinations, and PANAS PA and autistic logic to explore discriminant validity.  The 
correlation coefficients were non-significant. 
 Hypothesis 2b. EFA was not conducted due to low frequencies across the 
majority of TDI factors.  An EFA analysis would have been driven by the item 
frequencies and not by theory and the hypothesized relationships.
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DISCUSSION 
 
Findings  
 Hypothesis 1. Affective intensity was a better predictor of thought disorder 
severity and a more salient predictor of the severity of thought disorder than affective 
valence.  This offers some support to work examining the impact of affective intensity, 
across valence, on a variety of cognitive processes.  As reported earlier, Basso et al. 
(1994) showed that affective intensity moderates the relationship between affective 
valence and cognition, specifically word recognition.  It was found that low self-reported 
affective intensity coupled with positive mood was related to better word recognition in a 
sample of college women, and high self-reported intensity coupled with negative mood 
was related to better word recognition in the same sample.  Unlike Basso et al. (1993), 
the current results did not explore nor demonstrate an intensity by valence interaction for 
a measure of cognitive dysfunction, but instead hypothesized the significance of affective 
intensity over and above valence.  However, taken together with the earlier literature, it is 
posited that affective intensity may contribute to a more disorganized thought process by 
disrupting one’s ability to recruit associated networks and filter out unnecessary data.  In 
turn, this impacts the use of effective processing strategies and integration associated 
information in a way that allows for coherent expression. 
Hypothesis 1b was not supported; positive affect did not account for more 
variance in thought disorder severity than negative affect.  Conversely, negative affect 
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demonstrated a trend toward significance, t(22) = 1.77, p = .092.  This suggests that self-
reported NA may be more salient to thought disorder severity in this population than PA.  
It is unclear why NA emerged as a more relevant factor.  Ratings of NA intensity were 
lower (M = 38.50) than those of PA intensity (M = 67.83), which suggests that the current 
sample was experiencing more PA than NA, overall.  However, the current findings 
support earlier work in this area that has shown a relationship between NA and measures 
of neuropsychological dysfunction (Halari et al., 2006), and communication disturbance 
from the CDI (Burbridge & Barch, 2002; Docherty et al., 1994a; Docherty et al., 1997; 
Docherty et al., 1994b).   Taken together, this may reflect that the narrow, bottom-up 
processing associated with NA is more disruptive, because it impairs the ability to 
develop an organized expression of thought.  Impairment in the development of a 
coherent idea may be more detrimental than the inability to filter our expansive and 
overly inclusive information that was hypothesized. 
 Hypothesis 2. Results from the current study are also consistent with the relation 
between affective valence and cognitive processing reported in the literature.  The 
significant relationship between NA and autistic logic supports the association between 
negative affect and bottom-up, narrow processing seen in the literature.  Holzman et al. 
(2005) define autistic logic as “the respondent justifies a statement by rationalizing it 
with a ‘because’ statement that is illogical or based on private autistic reasoning 
processes rather than conventional, logical reasoning,” p. 70.  This definition describes an 
extremely narrow processing style that not only ignores or inhibits use of associated 
networks, but also fails to filter out irrelevant information.  This reflects a pathological 
“bottom-up” processing strategy in that the initial response details used to develop a 
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representation are illogically related.  While one might question whether the “private 
autistic reasoning” mentioned above includes attempts at recruitment of associated 
networks, albeit even loosely or tangentially, the inherent nature of autistic logic is a 
response style in which two parts (the statement and its rationalization) are not related by 
any logical or relational thread.  Overall, autistic logic appears to be very similar to the 
narrow processing strategy posited to stem from NA that is discussed in the affect and 
cognition literature. 
 While the relationship between NA and autistic logic occurred in the expected 
direction, the significant correlation for PA and fabulized combinations did not.  
Examination of PA and exemplars of broad, associative processing demonstrated a 
significant, negative association for PA and fabulized combinations.  While PA is often 
associated with more effective use of associated networks (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; 
Bar, 2009; Clore & Palmer, 2009; Fredrickson, 2001) and therefore more effective 
cognitive processing, it was hypothesized that PA would be related to an associative 
process that was over-inclusive and too broad in schizophrenia and schizoaffective 
disorder, and related to disordered thought.  However, the current findings suggest that 
PA is associated with decreased frequency of fabulized combinations in this sample.  
While this was the only significant relationship, this suggests that despite 
psychopathology, the positive influence of PA stands and may be protective in some way.  
Although it is not debated that cognitive decline is a prevalent feature of schizophrenia 
and schizoaffective disorder, the presence of PA may have facilitated the patients’ use of 
some preserved premorbid cognitive networks.  Fabulized combinations are characterized 
by forcing two contiguous percepts into a relationship that violates reality.  In the current 
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sample, this dysfunctional process may have been disrupted through an ability to access 
some more reality-based networks.  However, review of the direction of the other 
correlation coefficients does not fully support this pattern and further study is necessary 
to fully explore this relationship. 
Post hoc analyses were conducted to further understand the relationship between 
affective valence and thought disorder.  Mean PA and NA group differences were 
explored for the presence versus absence of each exemplar.  Of the 24 exemplars, 
independent samples t-tests could only be conducted on nine of the exemplars due to very 
low or zero frequencies (see Table 11).  A significant mean group difference was found 
for level of PA and presence of vagueness; individuals who exhibited vagueness 
demonstrated higher self-reported PA (M = 78.57, n = 7) than those who did not exhibit 
vagueness (M = 68.41, n = 17).  Significant mean group differences were found for self-
reported NA and confabulations, incoherence, and absurd responses.  Those who 
demonstrated confabulations reported higher levels of NA (M = 45.73, n = 15) than those 
without any confabulated responses (M = 26.44, n = 9).  Individuals who exhibited 
incoherent responses reported higher NA (M = 52.00, n = 6) than those who did not (M = 
34.00, n = 18), and individuals who did not exhibit any absurd responses on the 
Rorschach exhibited higher self-reported NA (M = 39.91, n = 22) than those who 
demonstrated absurd thinking (M = 23.00, n = 2). 
While the a priori and post hoc analyses described above support a relationship 
between affective valence and cognitive processing, the nature of the association is 
unclear from the current data and needs further study.  PA appeared to demonstrate some 
protective features in a priori analyses, but was later associated with the presence of 
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vague responding in post hoc analyses.  Moreover, vagueness was initially hypothesized 
to represent a narrow, bottom-up processing due to the use of very limited information 
and details used to create a response.  The relationship between PA and the presence of 
vagueness may represent the protective nature of PA described earlier; access to 
preserved premorbid reality based cognitive networks may have prevented more severe 
and unrealistic responses, but did not facilitate the development of a more detailed 
response.  Similarly, confabulated responses were hypothesized to be related to PA, 
however post hoc analyses demonstrated a relationship with NA.  In hindsight, the 
confabulatory process may reflect a bottom-up process.  A confabulated response is 
characterized by extreme elaboration of a percept that extends past the bounds of reality.  
Therefore, one focuses on details that later develop into an elaborate, unrealistic 
representation.  Interestingly, the correlation between NA and confabulations 
demonstrated a trend toward significance, r = .369, p = .076.   
Neither incoherence nor absurd responses were included in the a priori analyses 
for hypothesis 2a due to their level of disorganization and the difficulty understanding 
any form or source of the response by the examiner.  While, it is unclear, why NA was 
related to the presence or absence of such a disorganized response style, perhaps both 
NA, and incoherence and absurd responses reflect severity of schizophrenia accounted 
for by some other process(es) not examined in the dissertation.   
 The exploratory factor analysis (EFA) that was initially suggested was unable to 
be conducted due to low frequency of many of the exemplars.  Because all exemplars 
from the TDI were to be used in the EFA, those with a frequency of zero would introduce 
a confound in the analysis.  The analysis itself would no longer be theory-driven, but 
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instead driven by the presence of the exemplars that demonstrated a frequency greater 
than zero in this sample.  Therefore, the EFA was not conducted but should be 
reconsidered with a larger sample to explore the relationship between PA and NA and 
indicators of broad, top-down processing versus narrow, bottom-up processing, 
respectively, obtained in this sample.  While there are different rules of thumb for 
identifying a sufficient sample size for EFA (Field, 2009; Winter et al., 2009) it is 
difficult to project a necessary sample size to conduct the hypothesized EFA for the 
current study.  A large sample size will not necessarily increase the frequency of all 
exemplars and might elicit a set of exemplars that are most popular.  It could make sense 
to conduct an EFA based on the most popular exemplars, per previous studies.  However, 
of the most rare exemplars identified by D. L. Levy (personal communication, January 
19, 2013) (flippancy, vague, word-finding difficulty, relationship verbalization, 
fragmentation, neologisms), only relationship verbalization and neologisms were not in 
the present sample, suggesting that the frequency of some exemplars may be based on the 
composition of a particular sample or biases of a particular research group.  While the 
TDI is an empirically supported assessment of thought disorder in schizophrenia, the 
process itself is somewhat subjective, and scores are based on discussion and consensus 
of a scoring group, as was done in the current study.  
Limitations 
Sample. The current study has some limitations that impact the generalizability of 
the findings.  First, the sample size was somewhat small.  For example, significant results 
from two of the a priori and post hoc analyses using exemplars from the TDI included 
only n =1 (hypothesis 2a = autistic logic) or n = 2 (post hoc analysis = presence of absurd 
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responses).  Although the sample size exceeded the lower end of the sample necessary for 
the proposed analyses, a larger sample is necessary to broaden the frequency and type of 
thought disorder exemplars, replicate findings in this sample and increase the power of 
the analyses.   
Second, the current sample was an inpatient sample from an acute psychiatric unit 
that primarily serves an indigent population.  The sample likely differs in a number of 
ways from other inpatient and outpatient samples.  Individuals in the current sample are 
more likely to come from a more disadvantaged background than individuals who may be 
inpatients at other hospitals in the area.  Moreover, one might assert that individuals in 
the current sample may have had access to fewer resources throughout the course of their 
illness than individuals who are inpatients in other psychiatric settings within the study 
area, which may impact the severity of their current symptoms and overall deterioration.  
Paradoxically, some authors have found that higher social class is related to increased 
thought disorder severity using the TDI (Arboleda & Holzman, 1985; Haimo & Holzman, 
1979).  While level of education was the only measure of SES or social class included in 
the current study, there were no significant relationships between education level and 
TDI scores.  The level of education in the current sample (M = 12.13) is comparable to 
education levels reported in other studies using the TDI (Mschizophrenia = 12.70, 
Mschizoaffective = 13.70, Holzman et al., 1986; Msample 1 = 13.80, Msample 2 = 13.61; Carpenter 
et al., 1993).   
The point was argued earlier in this dissertation about the relevance of medication 
for understanding previous work examining the relationship between affect and thought 
disorder and differences between schizophrenia and affective groups.  For the current 
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study, all individuals were on at least one antipsychotic medication.  Nine individuals 
were on antipsychotics alone, and fifteen individuals were on antipsychotics plus some 
medication for affective disturbance.  Of the latter group of individuals, eight were on an 
antipsychotic plus a mood stabilizer, four were on an antipsychotic plus an 
antidepressant, and three individuals were on all three medication types.  There were no 
significant mean differences in thought disorder severity between those who were on 
antipsychotics only (M = 55.30) and those on antipsychotics plus an antidepressant (M = 
20.86), antipsychotics plus a mood stabilizer (M = 41.31), or those taking antipsychotics, 
an antidepressant, and a mood stabilizer (M = 21.14), F(3,20) = 1.24, p = .321.  When the 
sample was dichotomized into those receiving only antipsychotics (M = 55.30) and those 
receiving some combination of antipsychotics and medication for mood (M = 31.82), the 
results remained nonsignificant, F(1,22) = 2.58, p = .123.  Lack of significant differences 
may be due to combination of small sample and large variance. 
A similar comparison was done for medication and PANAS scores.  There were 
no significant mean differences for the four medication groups and PANAS total score, 
F(3,20) = 1.23, p = .325, NA, F(3,20) = 1.07, p = .386, or PA, F(3,20) = 2.12, p = .129.  
The dichotomized medication groups also did not yield significant mean differences for 
PANAS total score, F(1,22) = .116, p = .736, NA, F(1,22) = .955, p = .339, or PA, 
F(1,22) = 2.77, p = .110. 
Given the acuity of symptoms and the circumstances of an inpatient admission, 
this sample is also likely to be quite different from an outpatient sample of individuals 
with schizophrenia on concurrent measures of thought disorder and affective intensity 
and valence.  It is expected that the current sample exhibited more severe symptoms than 
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would be seen in an outpatient sample, therefore the current findings should not be 
generalized to an outpatient population.  While the persistence of thought disorder 
symptoms despite antipsychotic medication has been described here, it is likely that the 
current inpatient sample was more symptomatic across all features of the illness, 
introducing a more severe and complex presentation overall.  Finally, because of the 
short length of stay (~ six days) and the average length of time between hospital 
admission and testing, the current sample may have been experiencing increased stress 
and anxiety following the recent inpatient admission.   This distress could result in an 
overall increase in negative affect, and may be a contributing factor in the significance of 
negative affect in thought disorder severity.  While the PANAS asks for an “in the 
moment” rating of affective experience, adjustment to an inpatient unit likely has some 
residual effects that may contribute to one’s affective state for several days.   
 Setting. The testing setting also introduced a number of factors that limit the 
generalizability of the current results.  First, there was no designated testing location; 
individuals were tested in a group room that at times was frequented by other patients.  
While intrusions were discouraged as much as possible, the testing location was part of 
the larger unit milieu and therefore needed to remain open and available to other patients.  
Therefore, interruptions did occur and may have contributed to distraction during the 
testing.  Distraction could have disrupted the cognitive process such that (a) participants 
may have exhibited increased difficulty with organization due to disruption of the task 
and focus, (b) participants may have benefited from the distraction after being awarded 
an opportunity to redirect their attention, and/or (c) participants may have felt less 
comfortable sharing their thoughts with others coming in and out of the room.  A handful 
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of participants were irritated with others coming in and out of the room, and some even 
became angry and yelled at the other patients entering the room.  Depending on the 
progression of the testing battery when this occurred, one might expect that disruptions 
for these particular individuals could contribute to increased negative affect, which in 
turn may have impacted performance on the Rorschach and TDI scores.  While 
qualitative notes were kept about these types of occurrences, these were not specifically 
captured or assessed in any measure or analyses. 
 Participants were also not able to be uniformly tested at the same time each day 
because of the inpatient group schedule and the availability of appropriate testing space 
(the group room was the primary testing location), and the availability of the research 
group.  Therefore, some participants were tested in the evening on a weekday, while 
others were tested at a variety of different times on weekends.  This is significant given 
that the weekday schedule includes several therapist-led groups during the day and the 
weekend has none.  While no behavioral differences were observed, this could contribute 
to differences in performance, as one testing environment may have been more taxing 
than the other.  Physical and cognitive fatigue can contribute to disorganization of 
thought and variations in affect.  Therefore, a more taxing day on the unit may impact 
one’s ability to engage in the task, and may result in performance that looks more or less 
disorganized depending on the demands of the day. 
 Administration. All members of the research team participated in an intensive, 
three-day training on Rorschach administration and TDI scoring, as well as regular 
practice sessions prior to testing.  However, the current sample represents the first group 
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of individuals formally assessed by this research group and may be less uniform across 
testers than later samples evaluated by this group. 
Future Work 
Efforts to examine the proposed relationship between affect and thought disorder 
in schizophrenia involve several areas of study, all of which are reviewed in some detail 
in the current research.    
Procedure.  The current work should be expanded to include mood induction 
procedures to explore the impact of induced positive and negative affective states and 
thought disorder severity.  Broadening the current paradigm would allow for comparison 
of trait (as explored in the current research) versus state (via mood-induction paradigms) 
affect, and exploration of the robustness of the relationship between affect and thought 
disorder in schizophrenia.  A variety of mood-induction paradigms have been developed; 
a recent meta-analysis provides a comprehensive list of procedures used with this 
population (Cohen & Minor, 2010). 
Sample. The current sample should be increased and replicated within other 
inpatient samples to examine stability of the current findings.  As stated earlier, the 
current inpatient sample is characteristically indigent and is therefore not representative 
of other patients who are psychiatric inpatients.  Moreover, this particular inpatient unit 
has an average length of stay of six days; the patients’ symptom characteristics likely 
differ from inpatient units with a more chronic sample and longer length of treatment.   
The relationship between affect and thought disorder in schizophrenia and 
schizoaffective disorder should also be conducted with outpatient samples to examine the 
similarities and areas of heterogeneity across these samples.  The current project has 
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recently been expanded to include a sample of individuals at a local outpatient care unit 
that specializes in low income, chronically ill adults with severe psychiatric illness.  The 
addition of this sample will likely highlight other physical and psychiatric factors, and 
socioeconomic stressors that may exacerbate disordered thought in schizophrenia and 
schizoaffective disorder including homelessness, access to resources, substance use, and 
medication status (use, compliance, etc.). 
There are other factors that may moderate the relationship between affect and 
thought disorder severity and are worthy of examination.  An expanded version of the 
current study includes the Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR; Wechsler, 2001) to 
explore the role of premorbid IQ in thought disorder severity.  Measures of reading level 
are utilized frequently to assess level of intelligence prior to illness onset, and the 
subsequent cognitive decline that often follows.  Exploration of affect should also be 
expanded to include measures of specific affective experiences such as the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996), Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; 
Beck & Steer, 1990), and the Profile of Mood States (POMS; Lorr & McNair, 1988) 
which explores the following scales: tension-anxiety; anger-hostility; fatigue-inertia; 
depression-dejection; vigor-activity; and confusion-bewilderment.  Moderation analyses, 
similar to the work conducted by Basso et al., 1994, should be explored to examine 
affective intensity as a moderator of affect valence and thought disorder severity.  
Finally, given the support for the role of disposition posited in the literature examining 
affective intensity and cognitive functioning (Larsen et al., 1987; Schimmack & Diener, 
1997), personality factors should be explored as a moderator of the relationship between 
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affective intensity and valence, and thought disorder severity in schizophrenia and 
schizoaffective disorder. 
Broaden current analyses.  The current work examines fundamental questions 
related to the relationship between affect and thought disorder in schizophrenia and 
schizoaffective disorder.  Results from the present study can be expanded in a variety of 
ways to more fully explore thought disorder in schizophrenia and schizoaffective.  The 
TDI allows for detailed exploration of thought disorder at the exemplar level, as was 
explored in a limited manner here, as well as the category and severity levels.   
Hypotheses 2a and 2b should be expanded to include exemplars from the 1.0 
severity level.  While it was initially thought that exemplars at the 1.0 level were rare, the 
current sample demonstrated twenty-two instances of incoherent responses and one 
instance of contamination.  Therefore, future analyses with a larger sample could likely 
include exemplars at the 1.0 level.  Future analyses will pursue the EFA proposed in the 
current research when the sample and frequency of noted exemplars increase.  In 
addition, there are four categories to examine: deviant verbalizations, associative, 
combinatory, and disorganized.  These categories should each be explored, including 
their relationship with PANAS total score and NA and PA scores.  Analyses should also 
be conducted at each severity level (0.25, 0.50, 0.75, and 1.0).  The frequency of 
responses at each severity level can be calculated and compared to PANAS total scores, 
and NA and PA scores.  These severity levels can be further dichotomized into minor but 
odd responses  (0.25 + 0.50) and distinct presence of thought disorder (0.75 +1.0).  This 
represents yet another perspective from which to explore the impact of affective intensity 
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and valence on not only thought disorder severity, but also the clear presence versus 
absence of thought disorder as well. 
In addition to the category and severity levels present in the TDI, the total number 
of responses and measures of verbosity/poverty of speech may be useful with regard to 
the their respective relationships with affective intensity and valence. 
  Finally, total TDI scores can be categorized into clinically significant severity 
groups: >= 12 is clinically significant; 12-15 is mild elevation; 16-19 is moderate 
elevation, and >= 20 is severe elevation.  These categories can be used to further examine 
the relationship between thought disorder severity and affect intensity and valence.  The 
current sample includes 18 individuals that fall in the severe category, three in the 
moderate category, and three below clinical significance.   
Expand the exploration of affect. The study of affect in schizophrenia is of the 
utmost importance, given the somewhat limited but significant literature that is available.  
Routine assessment of affect including self-report of current emotional experience and 
changes in affect should be conducted to (1) improve understanding of the affective 
experience, (2) ensure the differentiation of negative affect and negative symptoms 
(Malla, 1995), and (3) monitor affect in relation to other core features of schizophrenia 
including, but not limited to thought disorder.  Furthermore, assessment should include 
indices of valence and intensity for a detailed explication of how thought disorder in 
schizophrenia may be differentially affected by positive versus negative affective states 
and on a continuum of intensity.  It is unclear if experiences such as irritability, 
depression, and euphoria in schizophrenia are differentially exacerbated by increasing 
intensity levels, and whether these changes contribute to different manifestations of 
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thought disorder; exploration of this idea will clarify the role of affect in thought disorder 
in schizophrenia and extrapolate to different affective states significant to mania (i.e., 
euphoria versus irritability).  
 To develop a comprehensive picture of the moderating effects of affect on thought 
disorder in schizophrenia, it is also important to explore this relationship in more detail in 
schizoaffective disorder.  Differing from schizophrenia by the presence of a significant 
affective episode, schizoaffective disorder provides a unique sample with which to 
explore the proposed conceptualization of thought disorder and affect in schizophrenia.  
While the diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder implies clinically significant emotional 
dysregulation, it is unclear to what extent these individuals exhibit the same difficulties in 
emotional expression and weak emotion-cognition associations described in 
schizophrenia.  Therefore, the assessment procedures described above should be 
implemented in this population as well to establish a comprehensive picture of affective 
experience in the schizophrenia spectrum.  Other testable hypotheses include differences 
in thought disorder in schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder when controlling for 
affect, differences in affect intensity between individuals with schizoaffective disorder 
characterized by depression compared to those characterized by mania, and each of these 
subgroups compared with individuals with a primary diagnosis of depression and mania, 
respectively.    
Implications 
The current study has significant implications for understanding the role of affect 
in thought disorder in schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder.  This study appears to 
be the first to directly examine the relationship between thought disorder and affect 
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intensity and valence in schizophrenia and schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, and 
represents the initial steps in what is hoped to be a new area of study.  The current 
research is not novel in the constructs that it examines, but in the manner in which it does 
so.  While both thought disorder and affect have been studied in schizophrenia, recent 
research suggests that there is still much to be learned about thought disorder in 
schizophrenia and schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, and affect may be a significant 
contributing factor in the presentation and severity of this impairment.  The current study 
represents the first steps by examining fundamental questions regarding the relationship 
between thought disorder and affect.  Overall, thought disorder needs to be systematically 
evaluated with the appropriate measures and throughout stages of treatment and recovery 
to better understand the features that are related to the remission of symptoms.  The 
current study hypothesizes that targeting affective disturbance will provide more 
immediate effects on thought disorder severity and reduce the likelihood of a more 
persistent and unremitting course. 
Studies of thought disorder in affective disorders and schizoaffective disorder 
suggest that those who receive treatment targeting mood lability or other affective 
symptoms also see a decrease in thought disorder symptoms.  While there is no direct 
evidence of these affective symptoms also remitting in the same fashion, it can be 
postulated that if affect is not a targeted area of intervention, as can be the case in 
schizophrenia, thought disorder is likely to endure in a chronic fashion.  This may be due 
to a similar imbalance in regulatory systems implicated in thought disorder in mania 
(Lake, 2008) that likely persists in schizophrenia in the absence of intervention.  This 
conceptualization further suggests that if affect is addressed and treated early in 
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schizophrenia then thought disorder might be less likely to persist in the enduring, severe 
manner for which it is well known.     
In addition to the novel exploration of the relationship between thought disorder 
and affect in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, the current study also supports work that 
formulates thought disorder as a form of cognitive dysfunction; significant relationships 
have been shown for measures of working memory (Docherty, 2005; Docherty, Hall, & 
Gordinier, & Cutting, 2000; Docherty et al., 1996b; Docherty, Strauss, Dinzeo, & St-
Hilaire, 2006; Kearns, 2007; Stirling, Hellewell, Blakey, Deakin, 2006); attention 
(Docherty, 2005; Docherty et al., 2000; Docherty et al., 1996b; Docherty et al., 2006; 
Subotnik et al., 2006); fluency (Docherty et al., 1996b; Stirling et al., 2006), memory 
(Docherty et al., 2000; Subotnik et al., 2006), and nonverbal sorting ability (Harrow et 
al., 2003).  Moreover, both cognitive dysfunction and thought disorder are both early 
symptoms of the illness that often remain stable and intractable despite antipsychotic 
medication (Goldberg & Green, 1995).  Therefore, it may be that in addition to 
treatments for affective dysregulation that may decrease the severity of thought disorder 
symptoms presently, treatments for cognitive dysfunction such as Cognitive 
Enhancement Therapy (Hogarty & Greenwald, 2006) or Cognitive Remediation Therapy 
(Wykes et al., 2007) when used in conjunction with treatment for affective disturbance 
may contribute to an amelioration of symptoms over time as brain function improves.  
This latter point needs further exploration as thought disorder is not evaluated separately 
from other features of cognitive dysfunction in treatment studies, and cannot be measured 
with typical neuropsychological batteries alone.   
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The findings from this study have significant implications for treatment of 
thought disorder in schizophrenia.  The current review clearly illustrates the limited 
impact of antipsychotic medication for thought disorder.  Extrapolation from studies of 
thought disorder in individuals with schizoaffective disorder suggests that treatment for 
affective disturbance may be beneficial (Andreasen & Grove, 1986; Harrow et al., 1986b; 
Holzman et al., 1986; Marengo & Harrow, 1997).  Furthermore, Cognitive Behavior 
Therapy (CBT), the second most preferred treatment for schizophrenia by clinicians has 
proven to be an efficacious and effective treatment for many symptoms of the illness 
(Wykes et al., 2008).  However, this intervention has limited support for thought disorder 
with no studies in a recent meta-analysis examining the use of CBT for thought disorder, 
specifically Wykes et al. (2008), and only brief acknowledgment in a manual for CBT of 
schizophrenia (Kingdon & Turkington, 2008).  While Kingdon and Turkington (2008) 
discuss that “emotional disturbance may be a significant feature of thought disorder” 
(Kingdon & Turkington, 2008, p. 134) and that, if recognized, “a different approach route 
may be needed” (Kingdon & Turkington, 2008, p. 134), they make no recommendations 
for how to do so.  Findings from the current study will likely provide additional support 
for the role of affect in thought disorder that, according to Kingdon and Turkington 
(2008) would constitute a modified treatment strategy than what is currently employed.  
One example may be the adjunctive use of a cognitive remediation program. 
As the current research trend in schizophrenia continues on the path of genetic 
mapping and functional MRI topographies, the need for exploration of endophenotypic 
features and treatments that are directly applicable to symptoms and the phenomenology 
of the illness is argued here.  The possibility of finding the etiology or cause of 
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schizophrenia is incredibly attractive, but sole reliance on that work often detracts us 
from focusing on remission of symptoms, reintegration into the community, and 
improved quality of life for people suffering with schizophrenia.  Several recent papers 
(Andreasen, 2007, Parnas, 2011; Strauss, 2011) have alluded to this conundrum and 
suggest that a return to the phenomenology of core schizophrenia symptoms such as 
thought disorder, affective experience, and the “whatness” of the illness (Parnas, 2011) 
will lead to the greatest pay-off for individuals living with this illness. 
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Table 1 
 
Thought Disorder Definitions (Andreasen, 1979a) 
	  
Poverty of 
speech 
Restriction in the amount of spontaneous speech 
Poverty of 
content  
of speech 
Amount of speech is adequate, but language is vague, concrete, and 
repetitive 
Pressure of 
speech 
An increase in the amount of spontaneous speech  
Distractible 
speech 
Disruption in the course of speech as evidenced by stopping in the 
middle of a sentence and changing the subject in response to a nearby 
stimulus 
Tangentiality Replying to a question in an oblique, tangential, or irrelevant manner 
Derailment  
(loose 
associations, 
flight of ideas) 
A pattern of spontaneous speech in which the ideas slip off the track 
onto another one that is clearly but obliquely related, or completely 
unrelated 
Incoherence  
(word salad) 
A pattern of speech that is essentially incomprehensible at times 
Illogicality A pattern of speech in which conclusions are reached that do not 
follow logically 
Clanging A pattern of speech in which sounds rather than meaningful 
relationships appear to govern word choice 
Neologisms A completely new word or phrase whose derivation cannot be 
understood 
Word 
Approximations 
Old words that are used in a new or unconventional way, or new 
words that are developed by conventional rules of word formation 
Circumstantiality A pattern of speech that is very indirect and delayed in reaching its 
goal idea 
Loss of goal Failure to follow a chain of thought through to its natural conclusion 
Perseveration Persistent repetition of words, ideas, or subjects 
Echolalia A pattern of speech in which words or phrases of others are echoed 
Blocking Interruption of a train of speech before a thought or idea has been 
completed 
Stilted Speech Speech that has an excessively stilted or formal quality 
Self-reference A pattern of speech in which the subject under discussion is referred 
back to oneself when either the person in question or another is 
speaking 	  
	  	  
 
91 
Table 2 
 
Measures of Thought Disorder 	  
Name of 
Scoring system 
Authors Level of 
measurement 
Measure of  
Thought Disorder 
Scoring system Subtypes  Psychometrics 
Communication 
Disturbances 
Index (CDI) 
Docherty, 
DeRosa, & 
Andreasen, 
1996) 
Subtype Semi-structured 
interview 
Responses are scored 
for the frequency of 
each of six types of 
communication failure: 
 
 
1. Vague references 
2. Confused 
references 
3. Missing 
information    
references 
4. Ambiguous word 
meanings 
5. Wrong word 
references 
6. Structural 
unclarities 
IRR: 
  
Vague:  
   r = .73 
Confused:  
   r  = .88 
Missing:  
   r = .89 
Ambiguous:  
   r = .88 
Wrong word:  
   r = .80 
Structural:  
   r = .93 
Total CDI:  
   r = .94 
 
Index of 
Positive 
Thought 
Disorder 
(IPTD) 
(Marengo et 
al., 1986) 
Global, 
severity 
Gorham Proverbs Test 
 
WAIS Comprehension 
subtest 
 
Goldstein-Scheerer 
Object Sorting Test 
 
 
1. Overall score from 
each response ranging 
from absent to severe: 
 
   0: Idiosyncratic 
verbalizations are 
absent 
  0.5: Mild cognitive 
slips 
  1: A definite 
characteristic or 
bizarre response 
  3: A very severe 
bizarre response 
 
2. Continuum score 
based on total summed 
scores from measures:  
  1: Absent 
  2: Mild 
  3: Definite 
  4: Severe 
  5: Very severe 
 
3. Composite index 
score used to assign 
individual to the 
highest/most severe 
level from the IPTD 
tests (continuum 
ratings 1-5) 
 
N/A  
IRR: r = .85 
 
Comprehension 
and Proverbs: 
   r = .64 
 
Comprehension 
and Object: 
   r = .50 
 
Proverbs and 
Object: 
   r = .60 
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Name of 
Scoring system 
Authors Level of 
measurement 
Measure of  
Thought Disorder 
Scoring system Subtypes  Psychometrics 
Scale for the 
Assessment of 
Thought, 
Language, and 
Communication 
(TLC) 
(Andreasen, 
1979a; 
1979b) 
Subtypes, 
severity 
Scores based on a 45 
minute open-ended 
interview; psychiatric 
symptomatology is 
not discussed 
Ratings of each of the 
18 subtypes of thought 
disorder based on a 0-4 
(1-9) or 0-3 (10-18) 
scale:  
   
   0: Absent 
   1: Mild (occurs once) 
   2. Moderate (occurs 
2 to 4 times) 
   3. Severe (occurs five 
or more times) 
 
OR 
 
   0. None 
   1. Mild (occurs once) 
   2. Moderate (occurs 
2 to 4 times) 
   3. Severe (occurs 5 to 
10 times) 
   4. Extreme (occurs 
more than 10 times, or 
so frequently that the 
interview is 
incomprehensible) 
 
1. Poverty of speech  
2. Poverty of  
content of speech 
3. Pressure of  
speech 
4. Distractible  
speech 
5. Tangentiality 
6. Derailment 
7. Incoherence 
8. Illogicality 
9. Clanging 
10. Neologisms  
11. Word  
approximations 
12. 
Circumst
antiality 
13. Loss of goal 
14. Perseveration 
15. Echolalia 
16. Blocking 
17. Stilted speech 
18. Self-reference 
 
See Andreasen 
(1979a) for 
weighted k for 
all definitions. 
 
Weighted k for 
global score: 
   k = .89 
Thought and 
Language 
Index (TLI) 
(Liddle et 
al., 2002) 
Subtypes, 
severity 
1-minute responses to 
eight Rorschach or 
Thematic 
Apperception Test 
items 
Responses are scored 
for the presence and 
severity of 8 subtypes 
of thought disorder: 
 
  0.25: Minor 
idiosyncrasies 
 
  0.50: Distinct oddness 
  
  0.75: Instability of 
thinking and  
perception, absurdity 
 
  1.0:  Complete loss of 
reality  
Impoverishment 
 Poverty of Speech 
 Weakening of Goal 
 
Disorganization 
  Looseness 
  Peculiar Word Use 
  Peculiar sentence 
    construction 
  Peculiar Logic 
 
Non-specific 
dysregulation 
  Perseveration 
  Distractibility 
 
IRR (range):  
   r = .60 
(peculiar word 
use)  –  
r =  .93 
(poverty of 
speech) 
 
Impoverishment 
IRR: 
   r = .88 
 
Disorganization 
IRR: 
   r = .82 
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Name of 
Scoring system 
Authors Level of 
measurement 
Measure of  
Thought Disorder 
Scoring system Subtypes  Psychometrics 
Thought 
Disorder Index 
(TDI) 
(Johnston & 
Holzman, 
1979; 
Johnston et 
al.,1986) 
 
 
 
Subtypes, 
severity 
Scores based on 
responses from the 
Rorschach or 
Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale 
Responses are scored 
based on presence of 
subtypes that represent 
a continuum of 
severity: 
 
   0.25: Minor 
idiosyncrasies 
 
   0.50: Distinct 
oddness 
  
   0.75: Instability of 
thinking and 
perception, absurdity 
 
  1.0:  Complete loss of 
reality  
0.25 
Inappropriate 
distance 
Vagueness 
Peculiar  
   verbalization 
Word-finding    
   difficulty 
Clang 
Perseveration 
Relationship 
verbalization 
Incongruous 
   combination 
 
Intermediate 0.25, 
0.50 
Idiosyncratic 
symbolism 
 
0.50 
Queer response 
Confusion 
Looseness 
Fabulized  
   combination 
 
0.75 
Fluidity 
Absurd response 
Confabulation 
Autistic Logic 
 
1.0 
Contamination 
Incoherence 
Neologism 
 
 
IRR: r = .90 
Note. IRR = Interrater reliability. 
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Table 3   
 
Thought Disorder Literature Reviewed 
 
Sample characteristics 
 
Study 
Sample  
 
Sample 
Composition  
Diagnostic 
Procedure 
Gender  
(% Male) 
Medication (%) 
Thought 
Disorder 
Measure 
Follow-up Outcomes for  
Thought Disorder 
(Andreasen, 1979b)  
N = 113 
 
Inpatient at 
index 
 
 
Sz = 45 
Mania = 32 
Depression = 36 
 
RDC 
 
Sz = 60% 
Mania = 44% 
Depression = 
39% 
 
 
“Nearly all 
receiving 
medication” (p. 
1326) 
 
TLC 
 
None 
 
PFTD/NFTD model significantly 
discriminated Sz and mania, and 
within Sz: 
   PFTD – Acute Sz and mania 
   NFTD – Chronic Sz 
 
(Andreasen  
& Grove, 1986) 
 
 
N = 194 
 
Inpatient at 
index 
 
Sz = 50 
SAD = 25 
Mania = 25 
Control = 94 
 
RDC 
 
Sz = 20% 
SAD = 44% 
Mania = 48% 
Control = 41% 
 
“Nearly all 
receiving 
medication” (p. 
350) 
 
TLC 
 
FU1: 6 
months 
after index 
 
Acute: 
Sig. distributions for most TLC    
   elements 
Sz and SAD distributions similar 
Mania > all, SAD, Sz (PFTD 
versus NFTD) 
 
FU1: 
Mania, SAD > Sz 
(Remittance, n.s.) 
Sz > Mania, SAD (persistent 
disorganization) 
 
1999)     (Cuesta & Peralta,  
               1999) 
 
N = 253 
 
Inpatient at 
index 
 
 
All Sz 
 
DSM-III-R 
 
67% 
 
Antipsychotics = 
100% 
AP + Antichol = 
62% 
 
TLC 
 
None 
 
Best fitting model: 6 factor 
negative, idiosyncrasies, 
semantics, attention, reference, 
disorganization model 
(GFI = 0.945, RMSR = 0.077) 
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Sample characteristics 
 
Study 
Sample  
 
Sample 
Composition  
Diagnostic 
Procedure 
Gender  
(% Male) 
Medication (%) 
Thought 
Disorder 
Measure 
Follow-up Outcomes for  
Thought Disorder 
(Harrow et al., 1982) 
 
 
N = 113 
 
Inpatient at 
index 
 
Sz = 48 
Mania = 34 
NP = 31 
  MDD and     
  mDD 
 
RDC 
 
Total = 60% 
 
Medication at Index 
(no med details): 
Sz = 29% 
Mania = 37.5% 
NP = 21% 
 
FU1: 
Sz = 76%  
   AP only = 100% 
Mania = 83% 
   Lith only = 58.3% 
   Lith + AP = 25% 
   None = 16.7% 
 
 
IPTD 
 
FU1: 7 
weeks after 
index 
 
Acute: 
Mania > Sz 
Mania, Sz > NP 
 
FU1: 
No difference in severity 
Mania > Sz (greater reduction) 
 
(Harrow et al., 1986a)  
N = 94 
 
Inpatient at 
index 
 
Sz = 30 
Mania = 34 
NP = 30  
   MDD = 21 
   mDD = 4 
   Other = 5 
Control = 34 
 
 
RDC 
 
Total = 61% 
Mania = 55% 
Control= 53% 
 
Medication at FU1: 
Sz = 77% 
   AP only = 91% 
Mania = 62% 
   Lith = 26% 
   Lith + AP = 15% 
   AP only = 21% 
   None = 38% 
 
 
IPTD 
 
FU1: 1 year 
after  index 
 
FU1: 
Sz > NP  
Sz = Mania 
Mania = NP 
(Harrow 
& Marengo, 1986) 
 
 
N = 191 
 
Inpatient at 
index 
 
Sz    = 44 
PNS = 67 
   MDD = 13 
   Mania = 16 
   SADd = 21 
   SADm = 5 
   Unspecified = 12 
NP = 80 
    MDD = 49 
    mDD = 5 
    Mania = 4 
    Other = 22 
 
 
RDC (primary) 
& DSM-III 
 
Sz = 61%  
PNS = 52%  
NP = 39% 
 
Antipsychotics at 
FU1: 
Sz = 53% 
PNS = 33% 
NP = 13% 
 
Antipsychotics at 
FU2: 
Sz = 59% 
PNS = 36% 
NP = 8% 
 
IPTD 
 
FU1: 1.5-2 
yrs after 
DC 
 
FU2: 3.5-4 
yrs after 
DC 
 
FU1: 
Sz, PNS > NP  
 
FU2:  
No difference 
  
	  	  
96 
Sample characteristics 
 
Study 
Sample  
 
Sample 
Composition  
Diagnostic 
Procedure 
Gender  
(% Male) 
Medication (%) 
Thought 
Disorder 
Measure 
Follow-up Outcomes for  
Thought Disorder 
(Harrow et al., 
1986b) 
 
 
N = 166 
 
Inpatient at 
index 
 
Sz = 48 
PNS = 51 
   MDD = 13 
   Mania = 9 
   SADd = 14 
   SADm = 5 
   Substance = 3 
   Unspecified = 7 
NP = 67 
   MDD = 38 
   mDD = 9 
   Mania = 1 
   Hypoman= 2 
   Other = 17 
 
 
RDC  
& DSM-III 
 
Total = 46% 
 
Antipsychotics at 
Index: 
Sz = 83% 
PNS = 67% 
NP = 23% 
 
Antipsychotics at 
FU1: 
Sz = 52% 
PNS = 36% 
NP = 13% 
 
IPTD 
 
FU1: 1.8 
yrs after 
index 
 
Acute: 
Sz > PNS, NP (RDC, DSM-III) 
PNS > NP (DSM-III) 
 
FU1: 
Sz > PNS, NP (RDC, DSM-III) 
(Harvey  
& Brault, 1986) 
 
 
N = 43 
 
Inpatient at 
index 
 
Sz = 22 
Mania = 21 
 
DSM-III 
 
Sz = 82% 
Mania = 81% 
 
Antipsychotics at 
Index: 
Sz = 100% 
Mania = 100% 
   AP only = 52% 
   Lith = 48% 
 
 
TLC 
 
None 
 
Acute: 
Sz > Mania (POS, POC) 
Mania > Sz (pressured) 
(Harvey et al., 1990) 
 
 
N = 41 
 
Inpatient at 
index 
 
Sz = 22 
Mania = 19 
 
DSM-III 
 
Sz = 45% 
Mania = 47% 
 
Medication at 
Index: 
Sz =  
    Antichol = 82.5% 
Mania = 
    Antichol = 57% 
 
Medication at FU1: 
Sz =  
   AP = 82% 
   Antichol = 68.5% 
Mania =  
   AP = 52% 
   Lith = 63% 
   Antichol = 52.5% 
 
 
TLC 
 
FU1: 8 
months 
after index 
 
Acute: 
No difference between Sz and 
Mania 
 
FU1: 
All thought disorder ratings 
consistent over 10 days 
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Sample characteristics 
 
Study 
Sample  
 
Sample 
Composition  
Diagnostic 
Procedure 
Gender  
(% Male) 
Medication (%) 
Thought 
Disorder 
Measure 
Follow-up Outcomes for  
Thought Disorder 
(Harvey et al., 1984) 
 
 
N = 40 
 
Inpatient at 
index 
 
Sz = 20 
Mania  = 20 
 
DSM-III 
 
Sz = 75% 
Mania = 70% 
 
Medication at 
Index: 
Sz = 100% 
   AP only = 100% 
Mania = 100% 
   AP only, Lith, or  
   Lith + AP 
 
 
TLC 
 
None 
 
Acute: 
Sz > Mania (POC, NFTD) 
Mania > Sz (pressured, PFTD) 
 
 
(Harvey et al., 1992)  
N = 142 
 
Inpatient at 
index 
 
All Sz 
 
DSM-III 
 
100% 
 
Antipsychotics for 
≥ 1 week: 30% 
Medication free for 
≥ 2 weeks: 25% 
Antipsychotic 
medication < 1 
week or medication 
free for < 2 weeks: 
45% 
 
 
TLC 
 
None 
 
Best fitting model: 2-factor verbal 
productivity/disconnection model 
(GFI = 0.915) 
(Holzman et al., 
1986) 
 
N = 107 
 
Inpatient at 
index 
 
Sz = 43 
Mania = 20 
SAD = 22 
   SADd = 10 
   SADm = 12 
Control = 22 
 
 
DSM-III & 
RDC 
 
Sz = 82% 
Mania = 67% 
SAD = 53% 
Control = 36% 
 
Medication at 
Index: 
Sz = 95% 
   AP only = 100% 
Mania = 100% 
   Lith, Lith + AP =  
   85% 
   AP only = 10% 
   Anxiolytic = 5% 
SAD = 95.5% 
   AP only = 38% 
   Lith + AP or Lith     
   + nonAP = 57% 
   Unspecified = 5% 
 
 
TDI 
 
None 
 
Acute: 
Sz > SADd 
Controls < all 
SAD ≈ Mania  
SADm ≈ Sz  
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Sample characteristics 
 
Study 
Sample  
 
Sample 
Composition  
Diagnostic 
Procedure 
Gender  
(% Male) 
Medication (%) 
Thought 
Disorder 
Measure 
Follow-up Outcomes for  
Thought Disorder 
(Jampala et al., 
1985) 
 
N = 165 
 
Inpatient at 
index 
 
Sz = 31 
Mania = 134 
   Blunt = 14 
   Non-blunt = 120  
 
(See Taylor & 
Abrams 1978) 
 
Sz = 58% 
Blunt = 43% 
Non-blunt = 30% 
 
No discussion of 
specific medications 
 
Lifetime exposure 
to antipsychotics 
(months): 
Sz = 33.8 
Mania/Blunt = 36 
Mania/Non-blunt = 
13.91 
 
 
Unspecified 
 
None 
 
Acute: 
Blunt > Sz  
Blunt > Non-blunt 
(Jampala et al., 1989) 
 
 
N = 142 
 
Inpatient at 
index 
 
Sz = 31 
Mania – 111 
   TD = 9 
   No TD = 102 
   
 
Washington 
University 
criteria (Mania) 
 
Taylor-Abrams 
criteria (Sz) 
 
Unspecified 
 
No discussion of 
specific medications 
 
Lifetime exposure 
to antipsychotics 
(months): 
Sz = 33.9 
Mania w/TD = 25.4 
Mania w/o TD = 
13.3 
 
 
Unspecified 
 
FU1: 
discharge 
from 
hospital 
 
Acute: 
Mania > Sz (severity) 
Mania > Sz (nonseq, FOI) 
Sz >Mania (bizarre) 
Mania w/ TD > Mania w/o TD 
(mood lability) 
 
FU1: 
Sz > mania (severity) 
 
(Marengo 
& Harrow, 1985) 
 
 
N  = 324 
 
Inpatient at 
index 
 
Sz = 85 
PNS = 132 
   MDD = 32 
   Mania = 38 
   SADd = 30 
   SADm = 15 
   Other = 17 
NP = 107 
   MDD = 60 
   mdd = 16 
   Mania = 6 
   Other = 25 
Control = 30 
 
 
RDC (primary) 
& DSM-III 
 
Total = 51% 
 
Antipsychotics at 
Index: 
Sz = 63% 
Mania = 49% 
Other PNS = 36% 
NP = 18% 
 
IPTD 
 
None 
 
Acute: 
Mania > Sz >PNS 
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Sample characteristics 
 
Study 
Sample  
 
Sample 
Composition  
Diagnostic 
Procedure 
Gender  
(% Male) 
Medication (%) 
Thought 
Disorder 
Measure 
Follow-up Outcomes for  
Thought Disorder 
(Marengo  
& Harrow, 1997) 
 
 
N = 180 
 
Inpatient at 
index 
 
Sz = 45 
SAD = 26 
PNS = 33 
   MDD = 8 
   BP = 19 
   Other = 6 
NP = 76 
   MDD = 43 
   Dysthy = 4 
   BP = 6 
   Hypoman = 2 
   Eat DO = 4 
   Anxiety = 3 
   PDs = 14 
 
 
RDC 
 
Sz = 60% 
SAD = 61% 
PNS = 48% 
NP = 40% 
 
Antipsychotics at 
no FUs: 
Sz = 24% 
SAD = 31% 
PNS = 58% 
NP = 85% 
 
Antipsychotics at 1 
or 2 FUs: 
Sz = 31% 
SAD = 31% 
PNS = 33% 
NP = 14% 
 
Antipsychotics at 
all FUs: 
Sz = 45% 
SAD = 38% 
PNS = 9% 
NP = 1% 
 
 
IPTD 
 
FU1: 2 yrs 
after index 
 
FU2: 4.5 
yrs after 
index 
 
FU3: 7.5 
yrs after 
index 
 
FU: 
Sz > SAD, PNS, NP (persistence) 
Sz > NP (FUs 2 & 3) 
Sz > PNS (FU3) 
SAD > NP (FUs 2 & 3) 
(Osher & Bersudsky, 
2007) 
 
N = 26 
 
Outpatient at 
Index 
 
 
BPeuthymic = 18 
Controls = 8 
 
 
DSM-IV 
 
BPeuthymic = 
50% 
Controls = 50% 
 
Unspecified 
 
Rorschach  
 
None 
 
Acute: 
BPeuthymic > Controls 
(Taylor et al., 1994)  
N = 232 
 
Inpatient at 
index 
 
 
Sz = 97 
   Core = 60 
   Noncore = 37 
SAD = 73 
Mania = 62 
 
 
DSM-III 
 
Unspecified 
 
Unspecified 
 
Unspecified 
 
Present 
versus 
absent  
 
None 
 
Acute: 
Sz > Mania (hypoverbal, 
frequency) 
Mania > Sz (hyperverbal) 
Core Sz  hypoverbal; Non-core 
 hyperverbal 
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Sample characteristics 
 
Study 
Sample  
 
Sample 
Composition  
Diagnostic 
Procedure 
Gender  
(% Male) 
Medication (%) 
Thought 
Disorder 
Measure 
Follow-up Outcomes for  
Thought Disorder 
(Ulas et al., 2008)  
N = 118 
  
16% 
inpatient at 
index 
 
 
Sz = 72 
Control = 46 
 
 
DSM-IV 
 
Sz = 61% 
Control = 56.5% 
 
Antipsychotic 
medication: 
Sz = 97% 
 
    
 
TLI 
 
None 
 
Sz < Control (QoL) 
TLI unrelated to QoL or 
depression 
 
Note. Antichol= anticholinergic medication; AP = antipsychotic medication; BP = bipolar disorder; DSM = Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; DC = discharge; Dysthy = dysthymia; 
FOI = flight of ideas; FU = follow-up; Hypoman = hypomania; IPTD = Index of Positive Thought Disorder; Lith = lithium; MDD = major depressive disorder; mDD = minor depressive disorder; NFTD 
= Negative formal thought disorder; Nonseq = nonsequiters; NP = nonpsychotic; PD = personality disorder; PFTD = Positive formal thought disorder; PNS = psychotic/not schizophrenic; POC = 
poverty of content of speech; POS = poverty of speech, QoL = Quality of life; RDC = research diagnostic criteria; Sz = schizophrenia; SAD = schizoaffective disorder; TD = thought disorder; TLC = 
Thought and Language Index; TLI = Thought and Language Index.  
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Table 4 
 
Thought Disorder Inventory Response Categories Using the Rorschach Inkblot Test (Holzman, Levy, & Johnston, 2005; D. L. Levy, 
personal communication, July 21, 2011) 
	  
0.25 Level 
 
 
Inappropriate distance Increase of distance: failing to recognize that the inkblot is merely a stimulus for a response and unable to consider what it 
“looks like” rather than what “it is” 
Loss of distance: becoming personally involved with the inkblot, including aversive verbal reactions or behaviors 
Concreteness: awarding underserved reality to incidental aspects of the blot 
Overspecificity: responses involving an effort at excessive and unwarranted precision 
Flippancy Flippant remarks, gratuitous joke telling, or wise cracks that depart from the usual social constraints of a testing situation  
Vagueness A response that contains too little information to score as a Rorschach response and may be a short cryptic phrase or a long, 
meandering, circumstantial paragraph 
Peculiar verbalization Odd words or phrases that may have a recognizable meaning but do not fit the context in which they are used 
Word-finding difficulty Simple absence of knowledge about what word to use 
Clang Rhyming or alliterative phrases 
Perseveration A response that has poor form with regard to the inkblot is repeated at least three times 
Incongruous combinations Single details of a blot that are contiguous with each other are merged into a single response 
0.5 Level 
 
 
Relationship verbalization Linking the current response to a prior one on a previous card and relating the two separate percepts  
Idiosyncratic symbolism Color symbolism: relationship between color and form are idiosyncratic 
Image symbolism: using concrete images to represent abstract ideas in an idiosyncratic way and with an air of reality rather 
than playfulness 
Queer verbalizations On a continuum with peculiar verbalizations with the exception that the examiner is generally uncertain about what is meant 
by the word or phrase used 
Confusion Responses reflecting a loss of train of thought, and respondents are unsure what they are seeing or saying, indicating some 
disorientation 
Looseness Losing focus of the communication; taking off into an unrelated, tangential or arbitrary area 
Fabulized combinations On a continuum with incongruous combinations; percept and ideas are condensed into conclusions that violate reality 
considerations about relationships between images, blot qualities, and objects 
Playful confabulations Fabulized combinations that are fancifully overelaborated and typically involve humorous and playful images 
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Fragmentation Clear inability to integrate separate elements into a whole percept 
0.75 Level 
 
 
Fluidity Something seen as one thing at one instance will be seen as a different object at the next instant 
Absurd verbalizations Responses that are totally arbitrary, and bear little if any resemblance to objective reality 
Confabulations Extreme elaboration: carrying to an extreme an elaborative ideational tendency that extends the percept beyond the bounds of 
reality constraints 
Details in one area generalized to a larger area: single small detail is clearly perceived, but is then used to interpret the entire 
inkblot in a way that violates the shape of the larger area 
Autistic logic Justifying a response by rationalizing it with a “because” state that is illogical or based on private autistic reasoning processes 
rather than conventional, logical reasoning 
1.0 Level 
 
 
Contamination Two separate and unrelated percepts are merged into one 
Incoherence Responses that are unrelated to the task and are not possible for the examiner or scorer to understand in any context 
Neologisms New, invented words that do not violate English morphology or phonotactics, yet are not real words 	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Table 5 
 
Sociodemographic Information for the Current Sample 
 
  
n 
 
M (SD) 
 
Skewness (SE) 
 
Kurtosis (SE) 
Age 
 
24 34.88 (15.61) 1.41 (.472) 1.12 (.918) 
Days in hospital 20 
 
5.7 (6.96) 3.45 (.512) 13.65 (.992) 
Years of education 24 
 
12.13 (1.26) -.254 (.472) 1.173 (.918) 
Age at first  
psychotic episode 
 
17 18.12 (7.53) .161 (.550) .527 (1.063) 
Age at first  
hospitalization 
 
22 19.75 (8.57) 2.14 (.491) 6.91 (.953) 
Number of  
hospitalizations 
 
22 16.41 (22.11) 2.98 (.491) 9.97 (.953) 
Duration of illness 22 13.89 (10.22) 1.22 (.491)  1.799 (.953) 
 
  
Frequency 
 
Percent 
  
Primary Axis I 
 
  Schizophrenia 
  Schizoaffective 
 
 
 
19 
5 
 
 
 
79.2 
20.8 
  
Primary Axis I 
specifier 
 
  Paranoid 
  Undifferentiated 
  Bipolar (SAD) 
  Missing 
 
 
 
 
14 
3 
1 
6 
 
 
 
58.3 
12.5 
4.2 
25.0 
  
Sex 
 
  Female 
  Male 
  Other 
 
 
 
4 
20 
0 
 
 
 
16.7 
83.3 
0 
 
 
 
 
Race 
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  White 
  African-American 
  Asian 
  Biracial-Multiracial 
     Other 
15 
8 
0 
0 
1 
 
62.5 
33.3 
0 
0 
4.2 
Living Status 
      
  Unsupervised in     
house/apartment/etc. 
      
  Unsupervised in   
rooming or boarding 
house 
 
  Supervised in  
Halfway house, 
community house, 
etc. 
 
  Homeless/Shelter 
 
  Other 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
1 
 
 
 
62.5 
 
 
8.3 
 
 
 
4.2 
 
 
 
 
20.8 
 
4.2 
  
Medication 
Compliance 
 
  Never 
 
  Self-medicate by    
       own criteria 
 
  Sometimes as  
       Prescribed 
 
  Usually takes as  
       Prescribed 
 
  Always take as  
       Prescribed 
 
  First time on  
       Meds 
 
  Missing 
 
 
 
3 
 
2 
 
 
4 
 
 
4 
 
 
8 
 
 
2 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
12.5 
 
8.3 
 
 
16.7 
 
 
16.7 
 
 
33.3 
 
 
8.3 
 
 
4.2 
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Table 6 
 
Sample Characteristics for Predictor and Criterion Variables 
 
 M (SD) Min Max Skewness (SE) Kurtosis (SE) 
PANAS  
Total Score 
 
53.17 (11.52) 34.00 76.00 .225 (.472) -.903 (.918) 
PANAS NA 
 
38.50 (17.89) 20.00 74.00 .690 (.472) -.973 (.918) 
PANAS PA 
 
67.83 (15.90) 28.00 98.00 -.273 (.472) .615 (.918) 
TDI Total 
 
40.62 (35.85) 4.17 128.75 1.48 (.472) 1.10 (.918) 
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Table 7 
 
Correlations for PANAS and TDI and Sociodemographic Variables  
 
 
** p < .01 (2-tailed), * p < .05 (2-tailed)
 Age Days in 
hospital 
Education 
in years 
Age at 
first 
psychiatric 
episode 
Age at first 
hospitalization 
Number of 
hospitalizations 
Duration 
of 
illness 
PANAS total 
score 
 
-.305 -.103 -.103 -.125 -.211 -.209 -.261 
PANAS NA 
 
-.263 -.003 -.130 -.247 -.156 -.253 -.285 
PANAS PA 
 
-.147 -.174 -.003 .093 -.130 -.022 -.058 
TDI total 
 
-.061 .079 .057 -.347 .113 -.189 -.125 
Age 
 
__       
Days in 
hospital 
 
.350 __      
Education in 
years 
 
.113 .559 __     
Age at first 
psychiatric 
episode 
 
.566* .408 .356 __    
Age at first 
hospitalization 
 
.747** -.233 .202 .616* __   
Total number 
of 
hospitalizations 
 
.138 .440 -.129 .317 -.021 __  
Duration of 
illness 
 
.830** .050 -.327 .199 .250 .150 __ 
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Table 8 
 
Correlation analyses for PANAS and TDI and Sociodemographic Variables  
 
 PANAS total 
score 
PANAS NA PANAS PA TDI total 
score 
PANAS total 
score 
 
__ 
 
   
PANAS NA .726** 
 
__   
PANAS PA .633** 
 
-.074 __  
TDI total 
score 
 
.408* .335 .215 __ 
** p < .01 (2-tailed) 
  * p < .05 (2-tailed) 
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Table 9 
 
Correlations for PANAS PA and NA and Exemplars of Top-Down Processing 
 
 PANAS 
PA 
PANAS 
NA 
Clang Flippant Rel.  
Verb. 
Idiosyn. 
Symb. 
Looseness Fab.  
Comb. 
Playful  
Confab. 
Fluidity Confab. 
PANAS  
PA 
__ 
 
 
 
         
PANAS  
NA 
 __          
Clang 
 
-.266 -.149 __         
Flippant 
 
.083 .256 -.043 __        
Rel. Verb. 
 
a a a a __       
Idiosyn. Symb. 
 
-.373 .297 -.087 .239 a __      
Looseness .057 .261 .035 -.090 a -.183 __     
Fab. Comb. 
 
-.416* 
 
.323 -.143 -.143 a .697** -.055 __    
Playful 
Confab. 
 
a a 
 
a a a a a a __   
Fluidity 
 
.029 -.220 -.043 -.043 a -.087 -.090 -.143 a __  
Confab. .024 .369 -.113 -.120 a .067 .187 .243 a -.159 __ 
*   p < .05 (2-tailed) 
** p < .01 (2-tailed) 
a.  Frequency = 0 
 
Note.  Confab. – confabulations; Fab. Comb. – fabulized combinations; Idio. Symb – idiosyncratic symbolism; NA – negative affect; Playful Confab. – playful 
confabulations; PA – positive affect; Rel. Verb. – relationship verbalization; 
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Table 10 
 
Correlations for PANAS PA and NA and Exemplars of Top-Down Processing 
 
 PANAS 
NA 
PANAS 
PA 
Word 
Find. 
Diff. 
Vague Inapp. 
Dist. 
Persev. Incong. 
Comb. 
Fragment. Autistic 
Logic 
PANAS 
NA 
__  
 
       
PANAS  
PA 
 __        
Word 
Find. 
Diff. 
-.125 -.051 __       
Vague 
 
-.222 .390 .013 __      
Inapp. 
Dist. 
.028 -.126 -.141 -.173 __     
Persev. 
 
a a a a a __    
Incong. 
Comb. 
,093 -.169 .314 -.211 .111 a __   
Fragment. -.232 
 
.177 .150 .113 .330 a -.010 __  
Autistic 
Logic 
.423* .136 -.043 -.111 -.141 a -.140 -.083 __ 
* p < .05 (2-tailed) 
a. Frequency = 0 
 
Note.  Fragment. – fragmentation; Inapp. Dist. – inappropriate distance; Incong. Comb. – incongruous combinations; NA – negative affect; PA – positive affect; 
Persev. – perseveration; Word. Find. Diff. – word finding difficulty.
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Table 11 
 
Frequency of TDI Exemplars 
 
TDI Exemplars 
 
Frequency Count 
Inappropriate Distance 22 
Flippancy 1 
Vague 15 
Peculiar Verbalizations 121 
Word-finding Difficulty 1 
Clangs 2 
Perseveration 0 
Incongruous 
Combinations 
 13 
Internal /External 
Response 
0 
Relationship 
Verbalization 
0 
Idiosyncratic Symbolism 4 
Queer 27 
Confusion 6 
Looseness 17 
Fabulized Combinations 12 
Playful Confabulations 0 
Fragmentation 6 
Fluidity 1 
Absurd 3 
Confabulations 56 
Autistic Logic 1 
Contamination 1 
Incoherence 22 
Neologisms 0 
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is in varying stages of the illness and recovery.  Treatment 
includes individual psychotherapy, group psychotherapy, 
neuropsychological testing  (MATRICS), individual family 
therapy, and the Multi-Family Group model of family therapy.  
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July 2012-Present Doctoral Intern, Massachusetts Mental Health Center – 
Continuing Care clinic (MMHC-CC):  The MMHC-CC is a 
Department of Mental Health outpatient clinic offering 
individual psychotherapy and psychological testing to adults 
with severe and persistent mental illness living in a variety of 
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services are provided at the PSC.  The PSC is a community 
clinic that offers treatment for a variety of psychological 
problems and accepts payment on a sliding scale.  Psychotherapy 
is provided from a Cognitive-Behavior Therapy orientation and 
includes exposure and response prevention interventions.  
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anxiety, generalized anxiety disorder, depression, post-traumatic 
stress disorder, and personality disorders.  Supervisor: Janet 
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observing and conducting new patient interviews.  Research for 
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Supervisors: Dr. Richard Lewine, Ph.D. and Dr. Rifaat El-
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experience with a range of disabilities including physical 
disabilities, hearing impairment, and low intellectual 
functioning, (4) and exposure to a myriad of different diagnoses 
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and levels of symptom severity.  Responsibilities consisted of 
individual therapy with patients experiencing depression, bipolar 
disorder, psychoses, substance abuse, anxiety disorders, 
personality disorders, suicidal ideation, and autism-spectrum 
disorders.  Weekly group therapy was also conducted, as were 
suicide risk evaluations, and testing including but not limited to 
personality assessment, intellectual assessment, mental status, 
malingering assessment, and assessment of independent living 
skills.  In addition, as a member of the interdisciplinary team, 
responsibilities involved presenting relevant information from 
therapy sessions and testing results to the treatment team.  
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learned and implemented included Cognitive Behavior Therapy, 
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for personality disorders, depression, adjustment disorders, and 
prodromal psychotic symptoms. Supervisor: Jay Irby, Ph.D.  
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• Unit populations included: 
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o Residential sex offender treatment – Adolescent 
o Residential treatment for sexually reactive youth - Child 
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